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INTRODUCTION 
As financial engineering becomes more sophisticated, taxing 
income from capital becomes increasingly difficult.1 A crucial issue 
for tax policy makers, then, is the ease—or difficulty—of tax-
advantaged transactions.2 Yet given the inherent secrecy of 
sophisticated tax planning, the necessary data are usually unavailable. 
In an effort to shed light on high-end tax planning, we offer the first 
empirical study of a high profile strategy known as “tax-free 
hedging,” which offers the economic benefits of a sale without 
triggering tax.3 We explore one method of hedging, in which the 
 
 1. See David F. Bradford, Fixing Realization Accounting: Symmetry, Consistency and 
Correctness in the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 50 TAX L. REV. 731 (1995); Alvin C. 
Warren, Jr., Financial Contract Innovation and Income Tax Policy, 187 HARV. L. REV. 460 
(1993). 
 2. See David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1312, 1314-15 (2001). 
 
 3. For a discussion of policy issues raised by tax free hedging, see Deborah L. Paul, 
Another Uneasy Compromise: The Treatment of Hedging in a Realization Income Tax, 3 FLA. 
TAX REV. 1 (1996); Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation of Equity Derivatives: A Partial Integration 
Proposal, 50 TAX L. REV. 571 (1995); David A. Weisbach, Should a Short Sale Against the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol13/iss1/3
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taxpayer issues publicly traded exchangeable securities, known by 
acronyms such as DECS and PHONES (hereinafter “exchangeable 
securities”).4 We focus on such offerings between 1993 and 2001, 
identifying sixty-one transactions that account for $24 billion in 
proceeds. Using these publicly available data, we offer empirical 
evidence about various non-tax costs, or so-called “frictions,” that 
discourage taxpayers from hedging with exchangeable securities. In 
so doing, we show why these transactions can prove costly. 
Relatedly, we explain why taxpayers often prefer to hedge through a 
different method—private “over-the-counter” transactions with 
derivatives dealers—a preference that, until now, has been suggested 
only through anecdotal evidence. 
Some frictions, including fees to investment banks, also burden 
over-the-counter transactions (and, for that matter, taxable block 
sales). Yet at least two frictions burden exchangeable securities but 
not over-the-counter deals. First, with a public offering, the taxpayer 
must announce the hedge to the market in advance, thereby 
precipitating a decline in the underlying stock price before the hedge 
is implemented. Likewise, a public offering is typically implemented 
all at once, and thus causes price pressure on the underlying stock. 
Over-the-counter deals generally can avoid these costs because they 
are not announced in advance and are executed in stages. Thus, we 
find that the announcement of an exchangeable offering is associated 
with a −1.62% average abnormal return in the underlying stock, 
measured on the announcement date and the following two trading 
days. However, this effect is imprecisely estimated. Later, when the 
hedging security actually is issued, there is a −3.33% average 
abnormal return in the underlying stock (i.e., over the two days 
before the security is issued) that is statistically different from zero at 
the 95% confidence level. 
Second, the complexity and relative illiquidity of exchangeable 
securities may force the taxpayer to issue them at a discount, a cost 
that should not burden over-the-counter transactions because 
securities dealers have a high tolerance for complexity and illiquidity. 
 
Box Be a Realization Event?, 50 NAT’L. TAX. J. 495 (1997). 
 4. See Schizer, supra note 2 (describing DECS, PHONES, and other hedging strategies 
involving publicly traded securities). 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 09 Gentry.doc  9/11/03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 13:9 
 
If generous pricing must be offered, arbitrageurs might be expected 
to capitalize on it and, ultimately, to trade it away. On the other hand, 
discounted pricing may be unnecessary. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that certain clienteles, including hedge funds, actually prefer 
exchangeable securities to the underlying stock. While our evidence 
on this question is not clear cut, our finding is more consistent with 
the hypothesis that issuers do not offer discounts (or, at least, 
discounts that are corrected in the short term).  
In general, our findings suggest that public exchangeable 
securities pose less of a threat to the tax base than private over-the-
counter transactions. Likewise, given the costliness of public 
transactions, taxpayers will not always turn to them if private 
transactions become more difficult, for instance, due to a targeted tax 
reform aimed only at private transactions. Yet some substitutions are 
likely. As (limited) support for the prediction that some substitutions 
will occur, we find that when a publicly-traded taxpayer announces 
an exchangeable securities offering, the taxpayer’s stock price 
generally rises. The implication is that in the deals in our sample—
and presumably in at least some other deals as well—the market 
believes that the tax savings or other benefits outweigh the costs. 
The Article proceeds as follows. After considering instances in 
which taxpayers can acquire a large appreciated block of stock, Part I 
outlines various ways of disposing of this stock, of which some 
trigger an immediate tax and some do not. Part II focuses on 
exchangeable securities, describing our data sample and offering 
summary statistics. Part III analyzes and quantifies important 
frictions that burden exchangeable securities, while also mentioning 
frictions that burden the other disposition methods outlined in Part I. 
Part IV examines announcement effects on the issuers’ stock and 
contrasts these effects with the announcement effects on other 
methods of raising capital, especially those related to the disposition 
of assets. Part V is the conclusion. 
I. ALTERNATIVE DISPOSITION STRATEGIES 
We begin by explaining the scenario that prompts taxpayers to 
issue exchangeable securities. After surveying various ways that 
taxpayers acquire large appreciated blocks of stock, this Part 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol13/iss1/3
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describes alternative disposition strategies for taxpayers that no 
longer want this investment. This Part concludes by flagging tax 
issues on which there is legal uncertainty. 
A. Origin of Appreciated Stock Positions 
Taxpayers acquire large blocks of stock in a number of ways. An 
individual might do so as a founder or senior executive of a firm, or 
as a successful passive investor. Firms also acquire stock in unrelated 
firms. In a tax-free reorganization, for instance, the taxpayer might 
sell a division to an acquirer in return for acquirer stock. Or the 
taxpayer might sell or spin off the majority of a subsidiary, while 
retaining a “stub.” Alternatively, the taxpayer might purchase a stake 
in a start-up through a venture capital investment or joint venture.5 
These large stock positions are often highly appreciated. The firm 
may have paid very little to acquire the stock (e.g., in a start-up 
investment), or the firm may have acquired the stock in a 
reorganization, such that the stock basis derives from a real asset that 
was subject to tax depreciation. These acquisitions may have 
occurred years earlier and, during the bull-market of the 1990s, stock 
appreciation was rapid, especially for high-technology firms. 
Regardless of the manner in which the taxpayer acquired the 
appreciated stock, the degree of taxpayer control over the portfolio 
investment will vary, as will the size of the taxpayer’s stake. Yet all 
the scenarios are similar in an important way: At some point, the 
taxpayer will want to sell. The taxpayer may believe the portfolio 
investment has peaked in value, or may need cash for a more 
promising opportunity. Individuals will also want to diversify, a 
motivation that, agency costs aside, should be less important for 
corporate taxpayers since the firm’s shareholders can diversify on 
their own. 
 
 5. In our sample, it is rare for the investor to acquire a stake in the underlying stock by 
simply buying shares in the public market. For examples of various ways of acquiring large 
blocks of stock, see Appendix A, which lists the deals in our sample and offers details about 
how the taxpayer acquired the block of stock. 
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B. Taxable Sale 
In these situations, the most straightforward response is simply to 
sell the position. If only a small percentage of the overall float is 
involved, the taxpayer might simply place a sell order with a broker, 
just as a retail investor would do. If the position is large, portions of 
the position can be sold in this manner over time, a strategy we call a 
“serial sale.” To sell a large position all at once, the taxpayer can hire 
an investment bank to execute a block sale.  
As discussed in Part III, these various sales implicate different 
disclosure requirements and costs. Yet these sales share one 
important cost: They are all taxable. Thus, individuals pay tax at the 
applicable combined federal and state capital gains tax rate. By 
selling, individuals also forfeit the opportunity to attain a step-up in 
basis at death that would eliminate the income tax on the unrealized 
capital gain. While the latter factor obviously is not a concern to 
corporate taxpayers, they typically face higher tax rates on capital 
gains (generally a federal tax rate of 35%) than individuals face. 
C. Tax-Deferred Alternatives 
Some investors, then, will have business reasons to sell 
appreciated stock, but tax reasons not to do so. These investors might 
favor strategies that offer the benefits of a sale, such as cash proceeds 
and insulation from risk, without triggering a current capital gains 
tax. Obviously, a “tax free” reorganization offers tax deferral and a 
change in the taxpayer’s investment (albeit no cash assuming tax is 
deferred), but we assume that the type of position owned by the 
taxpayer cannot qualify for such a reorganization.  
Tax advisors have developed various “hedging” transactions in 
which the taxpayer retains title and control over the appreciated asset, 
while transferring the economic return through a separate contractual 
arrangement. Short sales “against the box” are an old version of this 
strategy, while derivative securities, such as “swaps” and “collars,” 
offer more modern variations. Until 1997, taxpayers could transfer all 
the economic exposure of a publicly-traded stock, receive sale 
proceeds, and not trigger current capital gains tax. Tax would be 
deferred until the taxpayer physically delivered the property to settle 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol13/iss1/3
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the hedge.  
After a widely publicized short sale against the box, Congress 
responded in 1997 with the constructive sale rule of Internal Revenue 
Code section 1259. Technical details aside, the rule imposes a current 
tax if the hedge is too perfect, but allows taxpayers to defer their tax 
if the hedge is sufficiently imperfect. The key question is whether the 
hedge transfers “substantially all” of the risk of loss and opportunity 
for gain in the appreciated asset.6 Thus, the typical way to avoid 
section 1259 is to retain some exposure to the hedged asset’s return—
in other words, to use a partial hedge. For example, if an asset is 
worth $100, the taxpayer can accept risk of loss from $100 to $95 (by 
buying a put at $95), while retaining opportunity for gain from $100 
to $115 (by selling a call at $115). Such a combination of a put and a 
call is known as a collar. Practitioners generally believe that such a 
transaction does not trigger a current tax.7 
1. Issuance of Exchangeable Securities 
The core feature of a tax-deferred hedge is that the taxpayer 
transfers most, but not all, of the appreciated asset’s economic return 
to a hedging counterparty. One source of hedging counterparties is 
the public market. Thus, in the transactions that we study, the 
taxpayer issues an exchangeable security to public investors (or, in 
some cases, to institutional investors in a private placement). To 
serve as a close substitute for a sale, this exchangeable security has a 
feature that distinguishes it from the “classic” exchangeable debt 
studied by others: The holder, rather than the issuer, bears risk of loss 
in the underlying security.8 
 
         6. See I.R.C. § 1259(e)(2) (2003). 
 7. See generally David M. Schizer, Hedging Under Section 1259, 80 TAX NOTES 345 
(1998). In Rev. Rul. 2003-7, the government recently indicated that a band of exposure equal to 
25% of the hedged stock’s value on the hedging date does not trigger a constructive sale. Id. 
 8. One type of security in our sample, PHONES, resembles classic exchangeable debt in 
that it offers investors principal protection. But the very long term of PHONES—thirty years, 
compared with the five or ten year term that is typical of classic exchangeable debt—renders 
this principal protection economically insignificant. In substance, then, PHONES do expose the 
holder to risk of loss in the underlying security. For a discussion of PHONES, see infra Part 
I.C.4. 
 
 Studies of classic exchangeable debt have concluded that its use is not tax motivated. See 
Brad M. Barber, Exchangeable Debt, 22 FIN. MGMT. 48 (1993); Chinmoy Ghosh et al., An 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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For example, assume that a firm (“Corporation”) owns one 
million shares of stock of an unrelated firm (the “Stock”), which 
represents a 5% interest (with the rest held by public shareholders). 
Corporation has a cost basis of $20 per share, and the Stock price is 
now $100. On January 1, 2002, Corporation issues one million 
securities (“Debt Exchangeable for Common Stock” or “DECS”) to 
investors (“Holders”) for $100.9 Through the DECS, Corporation 
transfers most of the economic return in the Stock to Holders, while 
retaining some opportunity for gain in order to avoid a constructive 
sale. To compensate Holders for receiving less than all the 
opportunity for gain, Corporation makes a periodic payment 
exceeding the dividend on the Stock. Specifically, assuming the 
Stock pays no dividends, Holders receive annual interest payments of 
6% during the five-year term of the DECS. At maturity, Holders 
receive a number of shares of Stock (the “Exchange Ratio”) that 
depends on the trading price of the Stock at maturity. The Exchange 
Ratio is determined as follows: 
 
Stock Price at 
Maturity 
Exchange Ratio Cash Equivalent 
Amount 
Less than $100 1.0 Share Value of one share 
of stock 
From and including 
$100 to and 
including $120 
1.0 share to .833 
shares 
$100 
Above $120 .833 shares $100 plus 83% of the 
excess over $120 
The effect is to transfer to Holders the full risk of loss in the 
Stock. If the Stock is worth $15, then Holders will receive $15 
(whether in stock or cash). On the other hand, as the Stock price rises 
 
Analysis of Exchangeable Debt Offers, 28 J. FIN. ECON. 251 (1990). This is not surprising 
since, in leaving the issuer with full risk of loss on the underlying stock, these deals are not 
close substitutes for a taxable sale. Furthermore, these old exchangeable securities were 
developed during a bear market in which fewer firms had appreciated stock. 
 9. “DECS” is a service mark of Salomon Brothers. Other investment banks market 
similar products but use other acronyms, such as STRYPES, ACES, SAILS, MEDS, PEPS, and 
PERCS. 
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from $100 to $120, Holders do not share in that appreciation. DECS 
yield more than $100 at maturity only if the Stock appreciates above 
$120. At that point, Holders enjoy 83% of increases. For instance, if 
the stock price rises to $220, the Holder will receive $183. Since 
Corporation retains all appreciation from $100 to $120, and 17% of 
the rest, tax lawyers generally believe that issuance of a DECS with 
these terms does not trigger capital gains tax.10 
In the above example, the taxpayer is a corporation. It is more 
difficult (and thus less common) for individuals to use the public 
markets for hedging, since, unlike corporations, individuals are not 
able to issue securities under their own names. Instead, individuals 
form a trust to serve as an intermediary that issues the securities. The 
individual then enters into a hedging contract with the trust (with 
terms that resemble the DECS described above).11 The trust, in turn, 
issues a similar security to the public. This structure imposes fixed 
costs that do not arise for corporations, since a trust must be 
established and maintained. In contrast, corporate issuers are already 
equipped to issue public securities. 
2. Over-the-Counter Alternative 
Instead of hedging through the public markets, taxpayers can enter 
into private transactions with securities dealers involving equity 
swaps, prepaid forward contracts, or collars. As long as these hedges 
are structured to leave the taxpayer with sufficient exposure to the 
underlying stock, they do not trigger a constructive sale. Frictions 
arise in these transactions as well, but this study does not address 
them because public data are not available.12  
 
 10. See Schizer, supra note 7. 
 11. One difference is that the individual generally compensates the trust for time value—
not with a periodic payment—but by accepting a discount on the proceeds received. For 
instance, if the current price of the underlying stock is $100, the trust is likely to pay only $82. 
Meanwhile, the trust will still raise $100 from public investors, and will use the remaining $18 
to buy Treasury strips that fund a periodic payment to investors. 
 
 12. For instance, an “affiliate,” including an officer, director, or shareholder that owns 
more than ten percent of the firm, may have to hold the stock for more than a year before 
hedging (e.g., if the stock was acquired in a private placement) and the securities dealer that 
executes the transaction may have to comply with the volume and manner of sale limitations of 
SEC Rule 144 (i.e., on short sales with which the dealer hedges its own exposure on the 
derivative). There are also securities law constraints on nonaffiliates who hedge stock received 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Anecdotal evidence suggests that these transactions are common, 
and that the volume is considerably larger than the volume of public 
deals for which data are available. For instance, Liberty Media 
Corporation’s April 2002 Annual Report offers a rare glimpse of a 
firm’s over-the-counter hedging.13 In addition to issuing 
exchangeable securities to hedge $3.2 billion of stock (in transactions 
that are in our sample), Liberty reports that it also hedged an 
additional $9.2 billion of stock through over-the-counter deals.14 
Unfortunately, this detailed report is atypical. 
Notwithstanding data limitations, our analysis in Part III sheds 
light on the question of why taxpayers might prefer over-the-counter 
deals to exchangeable securities. One factor is that the private nature 
of the over-the-counter transactions is itself valuable, helping the 
taxpayer “sell” the appreciated stock at a higher price. A second 
factor is that public investors might demand a premium for holding 
complex and illiquid hedging securities, while securities dealers do 
not. 
3. The Economic Value of Tax Deferral 
While the financial press and even firms’ annual reports claim that 
the exchangeable securities provide a tax-efficient form of financial 
management, one would like a systematic calculation of the potential 
tax savings from hedging rather than selling a position.15 Estimating 
the basis of the issuer is complicated by the various ways in which 
the investors acquire their position, as discussed in Part I.A. 
 
in a private placement, but these constraints are modest. Small investors generally cannot use 
the over-the-counter derivatives market because of the commodities laws. For a discussion of 
these and other frictions, see Schizer, supra note 2 at 1345-56 (detailing nontax costs that arise 
in various hedging strategies.); David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal 
Foundation of Incentive Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 440, 461-65 (2000) (describing 
certain securities law constraints on hedging by insiders). 
 13. LIBERTY MEDIA CORP., 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2002). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Liberty Media’s 2002 Annual Report extols the benefits of both public and over-the-
counter transactions: “We were particularly active in the financial management arena in 2001. 
As we were anticipating a potential decline in public company stock prices, we took aggressive 
steps during the year to protect some of our public stock holdings. We used financial 
instruments to limit our downside risk in these holdings and to extract liquidity from non-
strategic investments in a tax-efficient manner.” Id. at 6. 
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Appendix A provides brief statements about how the issuers 
acquired their positions. Examples of typical transactions illustrate 
the difficulties in establishing the unrealized capital gain. For 
example, Kerr-McGee acquired its stock in Devon Energy in 1996 in 
exchange for its North American onshore oil and gas fields, 
presumably in a tax-free reorganization.16 In 1999, Kerr-McGee 
issued DECS based on its shares in Devon Energy.17 Kerr-McGee’s 
tax basis in these shares would be its carry-over basis from its oil 
properties, a number that is not disclosed but is likely to be quite low 
(e.g., due to tax depreciation). For the trust-based deals, the Snyder 
STRYPES Trust is representative. Daniel Snyder and various family 
members backed the trust whose securities were based on shares of 
Snyder Communications, of which Daniel Snyder was founder and 
chief executive officer.18 As founder of a highly successful company, 
he likely had a low basis in his shares. 
While we could not find systematic data on tax basis, we found 
several examples that confirm the claim that the issuer had a large 
capital gain. For example, the Tribune Company’s 1991 investment 
of $5 million in America Online was a tremendous success, 
representing over half of the shares on which Tribune’s issuance of 
$1.1 billion of PHONES in 1999 was based.19 Thus, almost the entire 
value of this position was a capital gain. By comparison, Tribune’s 
DECS based on its Learning Company stock related to an investment 
with more pedestrian performance.20 In 1993, Tribune acquired 
Compton’s from Encyclopedia Britannica for $57 million in cash, 
and in 1995, it acquired shares in the Learning Company in exchange 
for its equity in Compton’s.21 In 1998, Tribune raised $128.5 million 
in a DECS offering based on its position in the Learning Company.22 
Using the $57 million as a rough estimate of Tribune’s basis in the 
Learning Company (various intracompany transactions between 1993 
and 1998 could have affected this basis), the basis was 44% of the 
 
 16. See Kerr-McGee data in Appendix A, p.57. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See Synder Trust data in Appendix A, p.52. 
 19. See Tribune Co. issuing AOL stock data in Appendix A, p.56. 
 20. See Tribune Co. issuing Learning Co. stock data in Appendix A, p.55. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
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total value of the asset. In general, the other examples that we found 
suggest appreciation between these two examples, such that tax 
deferral is likely to be a key feature of these transactions. 
The size of the gain is only one of the inputs necessary for 
calculating the value of tax deferral. In addition, the applicable tax 
rate at the issue date (when the stock would have been sold) and 
when the security is settled (if it is settled with stock) will affect the 
tax savings. A firm’s tax rate on capital gains can be difficult to 
estimate because it depends on the firm’s capital losses and net 
operating losses. The term of the security, the firm’s discount rate, 
and various aspects of the security affect the amount of tax savings 
generated by hedging rather than selling the position.  
As a simplistic benchmark for the potential tax savings at stake in 
these transactions, Table 1 provides the present value of the tax 
savings from tax deferral under some simple assumptions. The 
corporate tax rate is assumed to be 35%. Various assumptions are 
made about the duration of the deferral (three, five, ten, and thirty 
years), the tax basis (zero, 25%, and 50% of the total value), and the 
discount rate (5% and 10%). Each cell offers the tax savings’ present 
value as a percentage of the position’s value. The length of maturity 
is the most important determinant of the tax deferral’s value. For the 
shorter duration instruments, the value of the tax savings is generally 
less than 10% of the value of the security. However, for a 30-year 
instrument, the value of tax deferral may be over 20% of the value of 
the asset. 
 
Table 1 
 Illustration of the Value of Tax Deferral as a Percentage of the 
Underlying Stock Value 
Tax Basis as a 
percent of current 
value 
 
0 
 
25 
 
50 
 
0 
 
25 
 
50 
Discount rate 5% 5% 5% 10% 10% 10% 
Length of deferral       
 3 years 4.76 3.57 2.38 8.70 6.53 4.35 
 5 years 7.58 5.68 3.79 13.27 9.51 6.63 
 10 years 13.51 10.13 6.76 21.51 16.13 10.75 
 30 years 26.90 20.18 13.45 32.99 24.75 16.50 
Source: Authors’ calculations. The table entries are the present value of tax deferral at the 
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date of issuance of an exchangeable security expressed as a percentage of the value of the 
underlying stock. The calculations assume that the security hedges the entire capital gain. 
These calculations belie many technical details that complicate the 
analysis of tax benefits. For example, issuers have the option of 
settling in cash, and possibly continuing to defer tax by issuing 
another security or holding the position unhedged. In addition, the 
issuer makes periodic payments and also retains some exposure to 
risk, each of which affects the issuer’s overall tax liability. Periodic 
payments—through which the issuer purchases the ability to share in 
further gains on the stock—reduce the issuer’s tax liability.23 On the 
other hand, since the issuer retains some opportunity for gain, 
subsequent share price appreciation can increase the issuer’s tax 
liability.24 These complications highlight the difficulty of precise 
calculations of tax savings, even if complete data were available. 
Nonetheless, the calculations in Table 1 provide the general 
magnitude of the tax savings from exchangeable securities relative to 
selling a position. 
4. Tax Uncertainty 
Of course, taxpayers themselves will know how much they stand 
to gain from deferring the tax unless there is uncertainty about 
whether the tax actually can be deferred—that is, about whether 
 
 23. Either they are deductible or they must be capitalized into the basis of the stock, 
depending on application of the straddle rules. See infra Part I.C.4.  
 24. As a simple example, return to the numerical example of a DECS contract from Part 
I.C.1. The issuer has a capital gain of $80 per share for each of one million shares. Assuming 
that the share price at expiration is $90 and the issuer elects to settle the contract with stock, the 
issuer will recognize a capital gain of $80 per share ($80 million in total) at maturity because it 
received $100 million for the stock for which it paid $20 million, despite the fact that if it had 
not hedged and had sold the stock at the maturity, the gain would have only been $70 million.  
 Alternatively, assume the stock price appreciates to $150 per share at maturity. The issuer 
can settle the contract by delivering 833,333 shares to the holders. Its tax basis in these shares 
would be $16.67 million. The gain associated with these shares would be the $100 million 
received at the issuance of the DECS less this tax basis, a gain of $83.33 million.  
 In addition, the issuer still holds 166,667 shares with a tax basis of $20 per share. The 
unrealized capital gain on these shares is $21.67 million. Note that any increase in the issuer’s 
tax liability is offset, from the government’s perspective, by a reduction in the holder’s tax 
liability. For instance, if the stock price declines—such that the hedge preserved the issuer’s 
profit (and thus inflated the issuer’s tax liability)—the holder will have a corresponding capital 
loss. 
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hedging transactions actually avoid triggering capital gains tax. Such 
uncertainty would deter marginal transactions. Yet the tax bar is 
generally very confident about hedging transactions in which the 
taxpayer retains the first 20% of appreciation in the underlying 
property, like a DECS transaction or the typical over-the-counter 
transaction.25 It is doubtful that many of these transactions have been 
deterred by tax uncertainty. 
A more aggressive variation of public securities has been the 
subject of uncertainty, though. With a “PHONES” security, the issuer 
does not keep any opportunity for gain on 95% of the hedged shares. 
Instead, the issuer nominally keeps the full risk of loss—the reason 
why a constructive sale arguably is not triggered.26 Yet this claim is 
aggressive because the security does not mature for thirty years, and 
so the present value of this risk of loss is insignificant. While 
uncertainty exists about whether this transaction “works,” 
conservative taxpayers remain free to use the safer “DECS” structure. 
Finally, there has been uncertainty about a separate tax question. 
Typically, taxpayers combine their hedging transaction with a 
financing, in that they receive cash (the equivalent of sale proceeds) 
at the same time that they transfer the economic return in the hedged 
asset. In return for this cash, taxpayers must compensate their 
hedging counterparty (whether it is a public investor or an investment 
bank) with a payment that is the economic equivalent of interest. It is 
not clear whether this interest expense is currently deductible. In part, 
the question turns on whether the hedge is structured to qualify as 
debt for tax purposes. While there is some uncertainty on the issue, 
DECS and PHONES generally are thought to satisfy this condition, 
but trust structures do not.27 Furthermore, under the tax straddle rules, 
the debt must not be too closely related to the hedge.28 Until recently 
 
 25. See Schizer, supra note 7. 
 26. PHONES is a service mark of Merrill Lynch. Other similar products include PRIZES 
and ZONES. 
 27. PHONES are thought to be debt securities because they guarantee holders the return 
of their investment. DECS are analyzed as a combination of a debt security and a forward 
contract. Trust structures, in contrast, are thought to be prepaid forward contracts.  See David 
M. Schizer, Debt Exchangeable for Common Stock: Electivity and the Tax Treatment of Issuers 
and Holders, DERIVATIVES REPORT, Mar. 2000, at 10, 12-13. 
 28. The technical issue is whether the debt has been “incurred to purchase or carry” a 
straddle position. See I.R.C. § 263(g). A straddle is defined as two offsetting positions in 
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(and throughout most of the time period for which we have data), 
many tax advisors believed that this test could be satisfied as long as 
the hedged asset was not purchased with proceeds from the debt, and 
was not pledged to secure the debt.29 Some tax advisors were more 
conservative on this issue. Since 2000, though, a proposed regulation 
generally has disallowed the interest deduction in all DECS and 
PHONES, requiring the capitalization of this expense into the basis 
of the hedged stock.30 
II. SAMPLE SELECTION AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
We create a sample of transactions having four characteristics. 
First, the issuer issues an exchangeable security with a payoff that 
depends on the stock of another company. Second, the underlying 
stock is publicly traded. Third, the issuer continues to own the 
underlying stock. This requirement eliminates transactions in which 
investment banks issue exchangeable securities—not to hedge—but 
to meet the needs of specific investor clienteles. Fourth, the new 
security eliminates a considerable amount of the issuer’s risk of 
holding the underlying security. In order to obtain the necessary data 
for empirical work, the sample ends in December 2001. 
To construct our sample, we start with a list of transactions from 
the Global Issues database of the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) 
in which the security is exchangeable into the common stock of a 
company other than the issuer. From this list, we search Lexis/Nexis 
and Dow Jones News Retrieval for news accounts describing the 
transactions and EdgarPlus for prospectuses, eliminating transactions 
that failed to meet the criteria listed above. Our search of the news 
media also has located several transactions not identified through 
SDC. 
Overall, the sample includes sixty-one transactions with gross 
proceeds of $24.4 billion. Table 2 provides the breakdown of our 
sample over time, indicating whether the issuer is a publicly-traded 
 
personal property. See id. at § 1092. 
 29. See David M. Schizer, Sticks and Snakes: Derivatives and Curtailing Aggressive Tax 
Planning, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1339 (2000). 
 30. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(g)-3(c), 66 Fed. Reg. 4750 (Jan. 18, 2001). 
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corporation or a private trust. The first transaction is from 1993. The 
volume of transactions grew through 1999, but fell in the last two 
years of the sample. Of the sixty-one transactions, public 
corporations issued thirty-seven of the securities, and trusts issued the 
remaining twenty-four, typically on behalf of high-net-worth 
individuals.31 Thirteen of the transactions are PHONES-type 
securities, and the others are DECS. For PHONES, interest rates 
range from 1.00% to 3.75%, while six of the eleven transactions have 
interest rates of 2.00%.32 For DECS, coupon rates are higher; all but 
three have coupon rates of at least 5.00%, and the highest is 10.00%. 
Table 2 
Security Issuance and Proceeds by Year 
 All Issues 
 
Public Issuers Private Issuers 
 
Year 
 
Number 
Gross 
Proceeds 
 
Number 
Gross 
Proceeds 
 
Number 
Gross 
Proceeds 
1993 1 0.77 1 0.77 0 0 
1994 3 1.11 3 1.11 0 0 
1995 10 1.92 8 1.30 2 0.61 
1996 5 0.83 1 0.05 4 0.78 
1997 9 2.92 4 1.52 5 1.41 
1998 8 2.86 2 1.64 6 1.22 
1999 16 8.96 11 7.93 5 1.03 
2000  7 3.50 5 2.29 2 1.21 
2001 2 1.37 2 1.37 0 0 
  
TOTAL 
 
61 
 
24.39 
 
37 
 
17.98 
 
24 
 
6.26 
Gross proceeds are in billions of dollars. 
Table 3 provides basic summary statistics on the transactions. The 
mean gross proceeds are $397 million, ranging from $12.5 million to 
$1.51 billion. The securities issued by public firms tend to yield 
higher gross proceeds. For the public issuers, on average, the value of 
the exchangeable securities is 9.06% of the value of the issuer’s 
 
 31. In the “trust” category, we include four transactions in which investment banks issued 
securities but entered into offsetting private transactions with individuals or mutual insurance 
companies, thus enabling the latter, in effect, to hedge “through” the investment bank. 
 32. These interest rates refer to the coupon rate for the majority of the life of the security. 
Some PHONES instruments have higher interest rates during the first few years after issuance. 
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equity (measured on the date when the security is issued). However, 
in the median transaction, the value of the exchangeable securities is 
only 2.64% of the value of the issuer’s equity, which suggests that the 
portfolio positions being hedged are relatively modest compared to 
the overall value of the issuer’s equity.33 The average proceeds of the 
hedging transaction represent 7.11% of the overall float of the 
underlying stock, suggesting that these transactions represent 
substantial blocks of stock in the underlying firms. 
Table 3 
Summary Statistics 
Variable / 
Sample 
Number Median Mean Minimum Maximum 
Offering 
Amount  
     
All Issuers 61 $224 m $397 m $12.5 m $1,510 m 
Public Issuers 37 $341 m $486 m $12.5 m $1,510 m 
Private Issuers 24 $207 m $260 m $73.2 m $1,000 m 
Size Relative to the Issuer’s Equity Value   
Public Issuers 37 2.64% 9.06% 0.29% 103.9% 
Size Relative to the Value of 
Underlying Stock 
   
All Issuers 60 4.24% 7.11% 0.31% 43.75% 
Public Issuers 36 4.14% 7.95% 0.31% 43.75% 
Private Issuers 24 4.24% 5.79% 0.83% 25.09% 
Underwriting Fee, Relative to Proceeds    
All Issuers 53 3.0% 2.80% 2.0% 3.5% 
Public Issuers 30 3.0% 2.72% 2.0% 3.5% 
Private Issuers 23 3.0% 3.01% 2.96% 3.25% 
Source: Authors’ calculations. Data on underwriting fees are unavailable for some 
transactions. 
 
 33. We cannot compute this statistic for the private issuers because the analogous statistic 
would require information about the overall wealth of the private individuals who are hedging 
through the trust. 
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To analyze costs associated with exchangeable securities, we need 
data on various aspects of these securities, including the 
announcement date. We also need security returns data on the 
issuer’s stock, the underlying stock, and the new security. The SDC 
database includes information on the exchangeable security’s size, 
maturity, coupon rates, and underwriting costs. If this information is 
not available from SDC, we use press releases and prospectuses. We 
calculate the market value of the issuer’s equity and the underlying 
stock using the University of Chicago’s Center for Research on 
Security Prices (CRSP) database. We also use the CRSP data on 
stock returns and trading volume for the publicly-traded issuer and 
the underlying stocks.  
We collect filing dates from the SDC database or from 
prospectuses. For announcement dates, we use the earliest mention in 
the financial press of the exchangeable securities offering (i.e., even 
if specific terms have not yet been released). If we cannot find 
information in the financial press or press releases before the 
security’s filing date, we assign the filing date as the announcement 
date. An issue with this methodology is that, even if the financial 
press does not report the announcement, news of the offering may 
still leak out before the filing date. To correct for this issue, we check 
our results, as discussed below, by running additional regressions 
without those transactions that have no separate announcement date. 
We also collect data on the price of the new security when it starts 
trading. We collect these prices from the New York Stock 
Exchange’s Trading and Quotation (TAQ) database, the Bloomberg 
database, or the security price listings in the Wall Street Journal, 
depending on data availability. For the statistical work that relies on 
the prices of the new securities, we only use securities for which 
trading begins within two trading days of the filing date for the 
security. Lastly, we collect short interest data on the underlying 
stocks from the Bloomberg database and data from the NASDAQ. 
Theoretically, in order to offer a comprehensive account of the 
frictions associated with exchangeable securities, we would also 
need, first, complete data about the frictions associated with 
alternatives and, second, comprehensive data about the tax benefit 
from hedging. Thus, two limitations in our data should be reiterated. 
First, data are obviously not available on the closest substitute for 
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exchangeable securities—over-the-counter derivatives transactions—
because, by their very nature, these transactions are private. 
Similarly, data on block sales and serial sales are not easily obtained. 
Second, the tax basis and tax rates of individual taxpayers are not 
publicly available, and firms do not typically report this information 
either. As we discussed in Part I.C.3, we expect that the issuers 
typically have large unrealized capital gains.  
III. POTENTIAL FRICTIONS 
Part I outlines four alternatives for taxpayers who want to dispose 
of a large block of appreciated stock: a block sale; a serial sale; an 
exchangeable security; and an over-the-counter derivative. Part II 
describes the data we have collected about the exchangeable security 
alternative. This Part identifies and measures key frictions that 
burden exchangeable securities, and compares them with existing 
evidence on frictions associated with the three alternatives. In 
particular, this Part reports our empirical findings about four 
frictions, and mentions three others that are not explored empirically 
in this Article. 
A. Fees 
Taxpayers must pay underwriting fees to investment banks and 
legal fees to law firms when issuing exchangeable securities. 
Moreover, in trust deals taxpayers must pay legal fees to create the 
trust and annual fees to trustees in order to maintain the trust. Yet 
comparable costs also arise when taxpayers engage in over-the-
counter derivative transactions, and also in block sales. The only 
inexpensive transaction, in this regard, is the serial sale. 
 
The last panel of Table 3 compares underwriting fees with gross 
proceeds. With few exceptions, the standard fee is three percent of 
proceeds. The exceptions are concentrated in the sample of public 
issuers, presumably because these deals are larger on average, and 
also because public firms (unlike special-purpose trusts) have 
continuing relationships with underwriters and can exact better terms. 
This measure of direct transaction costs does not include some of the 
fixed costs of the deals, such as the advice of tax counsel and, in the 
case of “trust” deals, the legal fees associated with creating and 
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maintaining the trust.  
 While the underwriting fees appear to be a standard percentage of 
gross proceeds, it is unlikely that underwriting has constant marginal 
costs. Instead, one would expect that underwriting has both fixed and 
variable costs, which would lead to a minimum deal size for which 
the standard percentage contract is profitable. Of the sixty-one 
transactions in our sample, only two have gross proceeds of $50 
million or less, three transactions have gross proceeds between $50 
million and $75 million, and four have gross proceeds between $75 
million and $100 million. We do not have data on underwriting fees 
for three of the smallest four transactions; for the transaction with 
gross proceeds of $50 million, however, the underwriting fee is 3.5% 
of gross proceeds. The transactions between $75 million and $100 
million have the standard 3% underwriting cost. We interpret these 
data as consistent with a minimum transaction size. 
In contrast, Mikkelson and Partch (1985) report substantially 
higher underwriting fees for secondary offerings.34 For registered 
offerings, they report a mean underwriting fee of 6.7% of gross 
proceeds; for non-registered offerings, they report mean fees of 5.0% 
of gross proceeds.35 On the other hand, the fee would be much lower 
in a serial sale, in which the taxpayer pays a commission to a broker 
just as a retail investor would. 
B. Announcement Effects and Declines in Price of Underlying Stock 
Another cost of hedging with exchangeable securities is that, by 
definition, the transaction cannot be done in secret. In order to attract 
buyers, the taxpayer has to announce the transaction before it 
happens.36 The announcement may raise concerns in the market about 
asymmetric information and corporate governance. For instance, the 
 
 34. Wayne H. Mikkelson & Megan Partch, Stock Price Effects and Costs of Secondary 
Distributions, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 164 (1985). 
 35. Id. at 166. 
 36. While the point is obvious with an offering to the public markets, the same is true of a 
private placement because potential buyers—generally, sophisticated institutions—learn of the 
taxpayer’s interest in cashing out. A difference, though, is that in a private placement the 
taxpayer can offer less detailed disclosure and is less likely to be sued under the securities laws. 
These two costs—preparing disclosure and incurring potential liability—are additional frictions 
burdening exchangeable securities. We do not measure the magnitude of these costs. 
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underlying stock price will decline if the market suspects that the 
taxpayer is selling based on private (negative) information, or if the 
market believes that the taxpayer has been serving a useful 
monitoring role that now will end. Because these price declines occur 
before the taxpayer has implemented the hedge, the taxpayer’s profit 
on the hedged asset is eroded. 
In contrast, other alternatives generally can be implemented more 
discretely, so the market generally does not know of the disposition 
until after it has occurred. Obviously, if the sale must be registered 
(e.g., a secondary offering), it is no more discrete than an 
exchangeable offering, but registration generally is unnecessary for 
firms that have held their stock for at least one year.37 Even if this 
holding period has been satisfied, officers, directors, and large 
shareholders are obligated to disclose transactions in the firm’s stock, 
but this disclosure can come after the transaction has been executed.38 
Thus, disclosure about a block sale or an over-the-counter hedge is 
 
 37. The origin of this requirement is Section 5 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e, 
which requires the “issuer” and the “underwriter” to supply a prospectus upon selling stock. 
While this requirement obviously does not apply to an investor that has purchased stock in the 
public markets, it could apply to an investor that has received stock in a private placement and 
immediately resells it, since the investor might be viewed as an “underwriter.” One way to 
avoid this problem is to sell such securities in another private placement (i.e., to another 
qualified buyer under SEC Rule 144A), but the sale price may have to be discounted because 
resale of such securities is restricted. Alternatively, the investor can sell the securities in the 
public markets under Rule 144, but, for the rule to be available, the investor must hold the stock 
for a year before the sale (and, in some cases, the investor can apply its predecessor’s holding 
period toward this requirement). See SEC Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. 230.144A (2001). In addition, 
the investor must satisfy certain volume and manner of sale limitations, and must file Form 144 
no later than the date of the sale. In some cases, advisors believe that investors can hedge on the 
over-the-counter market even before they can sell (i.e., before the Rule 144 holding period 
requirement has been satisfied).  See Schizer, supra note 2, at 1351-53 (describing various 
securities law constraints on hedging). 
 38. An “affiliate,” including an officer, director, or certain shareholders that own more 
than ten percent of a firm, must comply with Rule 144 when selling securities in the public 
markets (i.e., even if they did not acquire the stock in a private placement). Thus, an affiliate 
must file Form 144 no later than the date of the sale, and the affiliate must also comply with 
volume and manner of sale requirements (but not with the Rule 144 holding period, unless the 
affiliate acquired the stock in a private placement).  
 Other disclosure requirements can apply to investors with smaller positions that are not 
officers or directors. An investor that owns five percent of a publicly traded firm is required, 
under SEC Rule 13D, to report any sales within ninety days after the transaction. Likewise, an 
investor with a smaller position that is making periodic disclosure (e.g., in a form 10-k) may 
have to disclose the transaction if it is material, but, again, this disclosure comes after the 
investor has completed the disposition. 
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late enough to have no effect on the taxpayer’s return. With a serial 
sale, disclosures about early sales sometimes may have to be made 
before later sales have taken place; the information effects of such 
disclosures could reduce the value of the remaining position. While 
this is a disadvantage of serial sales, the effect should be muted by 
the fact that disclosure of one sale does not necessarily tell the market 
that another sale is coming. Disclosure aside, each of these 
alternatives involves an investment bank, whether as broker or as 
hedging counterparty, and theoretically, the bank could use its 
advance knowledge of the hedge to bet against the stock, thereby 
driving down the price. Yet the investment bank has a reputational 
incentive to be discrete and, in some cases, the risk of insider trading 
or other securities law liability is a further deterrent.39  
Thus, there is likely to be greater market scrutiny of an 
exchangeable offering than of alternatives. To estimate the magnitude 
of these announcement effects, we use the event study methodology. 
We regress the total daily return on the underlying stock on the return 
for the value-weighted market index and a set of dummy variables. 
We include dummy variables for each day in two eleven-day event 
windows, one centered on the announcement date, and the other 
centered on the pricing date.  
We define the announcement date as the earliest of either (1) a 
news account of plans to issue the exchangeable securities or (2) the 
pricing date, which is the date on which the securities are priced 
(typically the day before they are issued). For nineteen of the sixty-
one transactions, the announcement date is within two trading days of 
the pricing date, which implies that it may be difficult to separate the 
effects associated with the announcement of a security and the 
execution of the security issuance. By including both event windows 
in the same regression, the estimates reflect the effects of the 
announcement holding the effects of execution constant (and vice 
versa). As an alternative methodology for estimating the 
 
 39. Moreover, where the bank is the hedging counterparty, the investment bank will not 
want news of the disposition to disseminate until after the bank has hedged its own exposure on 
the derivative it has sold to the client (and, in the usual case, the investment bank hedges by 
shorting the stock). This incentive is diminished in cases where the investment bank passes this 
risk on to the client (i.e., by tying the price on the taxpayer’s derivative to the price attained by 
the investment bank on its short sales). 
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announcement effects, we focus on the forty-two securities for which 
the announcement precedes the execution by more than two days and 
estimate the model with just the announcement effect window.  
The market model allows each underlying’s stock to have a 
different sensitivity (i.e., market beta) to returns on the market 
portfolio. To estimate the model, we include available daily stock 
returns over the period starting 500 trading days before the filing date 
for the exchangeable security and ending with the maturity date of 
the exchangeable security or the end of 2001, if the security matures 
after December 2001. 
Panel A of Table 4 provides the average abnormal returns for the 
sample of underlying securities. The first column provides estimates 
of the eleven-trading-day window centered on the announcement 
date. On the announcement date, the underlying securities have an 
average excess return of −0.51%, but this estimated effect is only 
statistically different from zero (using a two-tailed test) at the 74% 
confidence level. Considering longer event periods suggests a larger 
negative effect, but without much statistical precision. For example, 
over the five-day window centered on the announcement date, the 
cumulative average abnormal return is −1.92%, but the p-value for 
the F-test of whether this set of coefficients differs from zero is 0.32. 
For the announcement day and the following two days, the 
cumulative average abnormal return is −1.62% with a p-value of 
0.14. 
Panel B of Table 4 reports the median abnormal return on each of 
the days in the event-window and the percent of transactions with a 
positive abnormal return on each day. Consistent with the average 
abnormal returns from the regression, the median abnormal returns 
and percent positive suggest that the announcement of the issuance of 
exchangeable securities has a negative effect on the value of the 
underlying stock, but the statistical significance of this result is 
marginal at best.  
As another way to examine whether our results are tainted by 
transactions for which the announcement date is potentially ill-
defined, we estimate the announcement window for the forty-two 
transactions in which the announcement date precedes the pricing 
date by more than two trading days. The estimated effects (not 
reported in a table) are larger in magnitude, but of marginal statistical 
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significance. The announcement day abnormal return is −0.31% (t-
statistic = −0.68), but the day after the announcement has an 
abnormal return of −0.85% (t-statistic = −2.12). The five-day event 
window has an estimated abnormal return of −2.47% (p-value for the 
F-test = 0.14), and the three-day window starting with the 
announcement date has an estimated abnormal return of −1.82% (p-
value = 0.061). 
 
Table 4 
Returns for Underlying Stocks Around Announcement and Filing Days 
Panel A: Average Abnormal Returns from Market Model 
 Announcement Day Filing Day 
 Abnormal 
Return 
 
t-statistic 
Abnormal 
Return 
 
t-statistic 
Event - 5 days -0.049 (-0.15) -0.060 (-0.13) 
Event - 4 days 0.44 (1.38) 0.13 (0.23) 
Event - 3 days 0.096 (0.26) 0.40 (0.83) 
Event - 2 days -0.085 (-0.20) 0.70 (1.46) 
Event - 1 day -0.21 (-0.54) -0.95 (-2.62) 
Event day -0.51 (-1.13) -2.38 (-4.20) 
Event + 1 day -0.44 (-1.17) 0.58 (1.33) 
Event + 2 days -0.67 (-1.45) 0.30 (0.73) 
Event + 3 days -0.11 (-0.26) 0.024 (0.06) 
Event + 4 days 0.60 (1.51) 0.55 (1.37) 
Event + 5 days 0.38 (0.91) -0.14 (-0.49) 
     
Panel B: Median Abnormal Returns and Percent Positive 
 Announcement Day Filing Day 
 Abnormal 
Return 
Percent 
Positive 
Abnormal 
Return 
Percent 
Positive 
Event - 5 days -0.23 43.3 -0.58 46.7 
Event - 4 days 0.031 51.7 -0.041 50.0 
Event - 3 days 0.073 53.3 -0.010 50.0 
Event - 2 days -0.38 43.3 0.33 55.0 
Event - 1 day -0.16 48.3 -1.29 30.0 
Event day -0.55 45.0 -2.15 20.0 
Event + 1 day -0.50 36.7 0.27 53.3 
Event + 2 days -0.75 40.0 0.29 62.3 
Event + 3 days -0.42 43.3 -0.065 47.5 
Event + 4 days 0.18 56.7 0.18 54.1 
Event + 5 days 0.36 60.0 0.061 45.9 
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Excess returns are listed as percentages; t-statistics are in parentheses. The sample has 
sixty-one deals. The excess returns are calculated using a market model. For the 
percent positive, given the sample size, the 95% confidence interval around the null 
hypothesis of 50.0% positive is [37.4%, 62.6%]. 
Since there are variations within our sample, one could imagine 
that the announcement effects on the underlying stocks depend on the 
type of security, although, given the small size of our sample, we 
approach sample splits with caution. Most importantly, we test 
whether trust deals generate larger announcement effects. The theory 
is that trust deals may convey news about how an individual insider 
feels about the prospects of the underlying firm. In contrast, many of 
the public issuers have no direct link to the underlying firm. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, the negative announcement day 
effects are concentrated in the sample of trust-based deals.40 For 
example, for the two-day window starting one day before the 
announcement day, the abnormal return on transactions with 
corporate issuers is 0.26%, but the abnormal return for trust 
transactions is −2.45%. This difference is statistically significant at 
the 95% confidence level.41 
These announcement effects are smaller than those found in 
secondary offerings. Mikkelson and Partch estimate a −2.87% two-
day abnormal return for the announcement of a registered secondary 
offering using data from 1972–1981.42 The timing of the 
announcement effect comes slightly later for non-registered offerings 
(i.e., it occurs mainly on the day after what they define as the 
announcement day), and the abnormal return is only −1.96%.43 
Consistent with this result, Hudson et al., find a −2.65% two-day 
 
 40. An alternative possibility is that the timing of the effects is different. The negative 
effects on the underlying stock in the trust-based deals, relative to the corporate issuers, are 
concentrated on the day before and the day of the announcement. In contrast, for the two days 
following the announcement day, the underlying stocks in deals with corporate issuers fall by 
1.53% but those associated with trust-based deals fall by only 0.34%; however, this difference 
is imprecisely measured. 
 41. To test another variation in our sample, we compare PHONES and DECS. We find 
that the estimates are too noisy to detect any difference. 
 42. Mikkelson & Partch, supra note 34. Consistent with the possibility that the negative 
effect depends on the closeness of the selling shareholder to the governance of the underlying 
firm, Mikkelson and Partch find that the negative effect is larger when the registration is on 
behalf of a corporate manager or director. Id. at 166. 
 43. Id.  
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announcement effect for completed secondary offerings using data 
from 1974–1989.44 One reason that secondary offerings may have a 
more negative announcement effect than the exchangeable securities 
is that the issuers in our sample retain some upside potential, 
although the fact that this exposure is retained in part for tax purposes 
should render it less reassuring to the market. 
In examining exchangeable debt from the 1970s and 1980s, 
Ghosh et al., also find that the announcement impacts the underlying 
share price, causing two-day abnormal returns of −1.11%. Based on 
anecdotal evidence, Ghosh et al. consider it unlikely that issuers have 
substantial evidence of the future prospects of the underlying stock. 
Instead, they posit that the dilution of ownership has a negative effect 
on monitoring and future share value.45  
Overall, despite the statistical imprecision of the estimated 
announcement effects in our sample, the magnitude of these effects 
seems reasonable compared to studies of similar transactions. We 
conclude that announcement effects are one cost of hedging with 
public securities. Since secondary offerings yield larger effects, 
exchangeable securities are less costly in this regard than one-time 
sales of stock. Moreover, this cost should be more important for 
issuers that are perceived to have inside information, and 
correspondingly may prove modest for firms that are perceived to be 
outsiders. 
C. Execution of the Transaction and Price Pressure 
The underlying stock price can be affected not only by the 
announcement, but also by the execution of exchangeable offerings. 
In an execution effect, the price decline is not driven by information 
(e.g., the negative signal when an insider sells), but by liquidity.46 In 
a fragmented securities market, a sudden surge of sale orders can 
 
 44. Carl D. Hudson et al., Informational Versus Price-Pressure Effects: Evidence From 
Secondary Offerings, 16 J. FIN. RES. 193, 297 tbl. 2 (1993). 
 45. See Ghosh et al., supra note 8. A potential difference in the signaling effects 
associated with those transactions is that the issuer continued to bear the risk of loss in the 
underlying stock, unlike the mandatory exchangeables in our sample. Id. 
 46. There is one exception.  Execution of the offering can convey information when the 
market is uncertain whether the announced transaction will be completed. 
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trigger a temporary dip in price.47 Since the exchangeable securities 
are close substitutes for the underlying stock, the offering may 
function like a sale of a large block of stock. Typically, the entire 
offering is issued on the same day.48 Thus, in anticipation of a price 
decline, the underwriter may discount the offering price, reducing the 
taxpayer’s proceeds (and thus the profit from the appreciated asset). 
Notably, this cost also arises in a block sale.  
In contrast, a serial sale is less likely to trigger this effect. By 
selling in drips and drabs, the taxpayer hopes to avoid flooding the 
market.49 An over-the-counter derivative can also be constructed to 
avoid this liquidity effect. The hedge can take effect over a few 
days—with a portion of the position hedged each day—so the 
investment bank’s short sales are not concentrated enough to cause 
price pressure. 
Thus, price pressure is more important for exchangeable securities 
than for key alternatives. To estimate the magnitude of this friction, 
we examine the price of the underlying stock around the issue date; 
we list the estimated average abnormal returns from the eleven-day 
window around the issue date in the second column of Panel A of 
Table 4. Again, we estimate the effects of the announcement date and 
the filing date in the same model so that we do not confound 
informational effects from the announcement with execution effects. 
On the day before the filing date, the abnormal return for underlying 
stock is −0.95%, and is statistically significant at the 95% confidence 
 
 47. These effects are discussed in the literature on the price elasticity of stocks. See, e.g., 
Laurie Simon Hodrick, Does Stock Price Elasticity Affect Corporate Financial Decisions?, 52 
J. FIN. ECON. 225 (1999); Robert W. Holthausen et al., Large-Black Transactions, the Speed of 
Response, and Temporary and Permanent Stock-Price Effects, 26 J. FIN. ECON. 71 (1990); 
Andrei Shliefer, Do Demand Curves for Stocks Slope Down?, 41 J. FIN. 579 (1986). 
 48. In fact, it is difficult to issue a security to public markets over the course of several 
days. For one thing, the disclosure must be updated for each mini-offering (although, to an 
extent, this problem can be ameliorated with a so-called shelf registration). Also, in order for 
the various mini-offerings to be fungible, they must have the same economic terms. Yet this 
goal is hard to achieve if the securities are issued on different days, assuming (as is customary) 
that the exchangeable security’s issue price is the same as the underlying stock price when 
issued. 
 49. If the sale must comply with Rule 144 (e.g., because the seller is an affiliate or 
because the stock was originally received in a private placement), the seller must comply with 
the volume and manner of sale limitations. Given the limits on how the selling broker can 
“shop” a customer’s offer in these circumstances, the seller may not get the best execution. 
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level. On the filing date, the abnormal return is −2.38% and 
statistically different from zero at the 99% confidence level. For the 
two-day period, the abnormal return is −3.33%, suggesting that the 
underlying stock faces price pressure when the exchangeable security 
is issued.50 Panel B of Table 4 examines the median abnormal returns 
and the percent of abnormal returns that are positive. These data are 
consistent with our inferences about average abnormal returns.  
Price pressure sometimes is a transitory phenomenon caused by 
placing a large order over a short period of time. If the price pressure 
is a transitory effect, then the price of the underlying stock should 
rebound shortly after the negative effect of the transaction. While the 
abnormal return on the underlying stock for the first five days after 
the filing day is a combined 1.31%, this estimated effect is only 
statistically different from zero at the 80% confidence level. In any 
event, a rebound does not wholly compensate the issuer for the price 
pressure because the decline occurs before the issuer hedges, while 
the rebound occurs after the hedge is in place. 
The issuer’s participation in the rebound depends on features of 
the hedging security. After issuing a DECS, for example, the issuer 
still holds the stock, but is also effectively short an out-of-the-money 
call option on the stock and long an at-the-money put option on the 
stock. While the issuer nominally retains all appreciation just above 
the initial stock price (i.e., up until the exercise price on the call 
option), the issuer, in fact, does not keep this entire value; 
unfortunately for the issuer, this appreciation reduces the value of the 
put option purchased by the issuer and, correspondingly, increases 
the value of the call option sold by the issuer, thereby increasing the 
issuer’s liability on the DECS.51  
 
 50. These abnormal returns do not vary systematically across trust-based and corporate 
issuer transactions or across PHONES and DECS. In addition, we obtain similar results if we 
exclude observations for which the announcement date is within two days of the pricing date. 
 51. For example, when the stock price is $100, a five-year call option with a strike price 
of $120 has a Black-Scholes value of $26.120, assuming volatility of 0.27, an interest rate of 
5% and no dividends. When the stock price rises by a dollar, the Black-Scholes option value 
increases to $26.780. By selling such a call through a DECS, then, the issuer loses $0.66 on the 
DECS as the stock price rises from $100 to $101. To be precise, though, the issuer sells only a 
fraction of a call.  Since the holder typically gets only 83% of the appreciation above $120, the 
issuer only loses $0.55 (83% of $0.66) by being short the call option. As noted, the issuer also 
loses on the at-the-money put option embedded in the DECS. Worth $11.976 when the stock 
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Finally, a caveat is in order. While the underlying stock price 
clearly declines when the exchangeable security is issued, and we 
believe at least some of this decline is attributable to price pressure 
that arises from market microstructure, as discussed here, it is 
possible that some (or, conceivably, all) of this price decline is 
attributable to a different friction. In our view, the most likely 
candidate is the need to offer public investors generous pricing. We 
now turn to that cost. 
D. Generous Pricing for Public Investors on Hedging Security 
In theory, it is difficult to say whether issuers have to offer 
generous pricing to investors in order to sell exchangeable securities. 
On one hand, there are reasons why generous pricing would be 
necessary, and, on the other hand, reasons why it would not. After 
outlining the competing considerations, we turn to the empirical 
evidence. 
1. Why Generous Pricing Might Be Necessary 
While exchangeable securities are close substitutes for the stock, 
they are not perfect substitutes. Although typically issued at the same 
price as the underlying stock, they do not have the same economic 
terms. DECS, for instance, offer a larger periodic payment in return 
for less opportunity for gain.52 The key point is not that the securities 
are different per se, but that these differences may be unfamiliar. 
Hence, public investors may demand discounted pricing before 
accepting such complexity.53 In addition, the exchangeable security is 
 
price is $100, the put value declines by $0.238 to $11.738 when the stock price is $101. 
Overall, then, the issuer gains $1 from the price increase by owning the stock but losses $0.788 
from the options embedded in the DECS, for an overall gain of $0.212. Thus, the issuer 
participates fully in the underlying stock returns before issuance (the decline) but participates 
only partially in these returns after issuance (the rebound). On the assumed facts, the issuer 
participates in roughly 20% of subsequent appreciation. 
 52. In a case study, Mitchell Petersen values a DECS issued by Solomon Brothers based 
on Cincinnati Bell stock. In that case, the critical issue is whether dividends will remain at their 
historical level, or will be increased to preserve the historic yield. Mitchell Peterson, Western 
Souther Enterprises Case (2001), available at http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/ 
petersen/htm/cases/wse_case.pdf. 
 53. Cf. Jun-Koo Kang & Yul W. Lee, The Pricing of Convertible Debt Offerings, 41 J. 
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less liquid than the underlying stock because it has a smaller float. If 
investors value liquidity, they will prefer the stock unless the 
exchangeable security offers generous terms.54  
If needed, generous pricing represents a friction unique to 
exchangeable securities. Obviously such a discount is not needed if 
the issuer merely sells the stock, whether in a serial sale or in a block 
sale. A discount also should not be necessary in an over-the-counter 
derivative transaction, since a securities dealer will not be daunted by 
complexity or illiquidity, given the dealer’s expertise and his ability 
to hedge the derivative through short sales in the public markets.55  
Assuming that exchangeable securities must be issued at a 
discount—and we will soon outline reasons why a discount may be 
unnecessary—discounted pricing should have at least three, and 
possibly four, effects. First, volume in the underlying stock should 
increase when the exchangeable security is issued. Once this security 
becomes available, some investors who already own the stock will 
sell it, replacing it with exchangeable securities. This clientele will be 
relatively indifferent to the latter security’s complexity and illiquidity 
because these investors (e.g., university endowments) are 
sophisticated and plan to hold the security for the long term. 
Second, the short interest in the underlying stock should rise when 
the exchangeable security is issued. Once this security becomes 
available, arbitrageurs, who may not already own the underlying 
stock, are likely to sell it short and buy the exchangeable security as a 
way to capitalize on the generous pricing. Third, the price of the 
underlying stock should decline when the exchangeable security is 
issued. The sales described above—and, more generally, the fact that 
a more generous alternative has become available—could suggest 
declining demand for the underlying stock. 
 
FIN. ECON. 231 (1996) (finding that convertible bonds have an excess return, relative to an 
index of convertible bonds, of 1.11%; and arguing that this underpricing of convertibles on the 
first day of reported trading is a discount, which is needed because of uncertainty about the 
convertible’s true value). 
 54. For a general discussion of how illiquidity can affect stock returns and raise the 
required rate of return on a security, see Michael J. Brennan & Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, 
Market Microstructure and Asset Pricing: On the Compensation for Illiquidity in Stock 
Returns, 41 J. FIN. ECON. 441 (1996). 
 55. We make the assumption here that dealers are subject to enough competitive pressure 
that they cannot charge for factors that do not increase their costs. 
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Finally, although not guaranteed to occur, the price of the 
exchangeable security may rise relative to the price of the underlying 
stock. The key question is which investor benefits from the generous 
pricing—or, to be more precise, how long it will take for this 
generous pricing to be corrected. If initial investors capture this 
benefit, then investing in the exchangeable security will generate 
positive excess returns shortly after trading begins. For generous 
pricing to be a short-term phenomenon, a subsequent purchaser must 
not also demand generous pricing. Yet in the case of liquidity and 
complexity, subsequent purchasers presumably would also demand 
generous pricing. If so, the generous pricing would compensate long-
term holders over the life of the contract (e.g., through above-market 
periodic payments). 
2. Why Generous Pricing Might Not Be Necessary 
It is also possible, however, that there is no need to offer generous 
pricing. For some clienteles, exchangeable securities may be more 
appealing than the underlying stock. Under state law, pension funds 
and insurance companies are required to hold a minimum percentage 
of assets in debt securities. Yet managers of these portfolios may 
prefer the greater expected returns associated with equity. 
Exchangeable securities have the advantage of offering equity 
returns, while being treated by these unsophisticated state law 
regimes as debt securities.56 In addition, if the underlying stock is a 
growth stock that pays no dividend, as is often the case, some 
investors may prefer to give up a portion of potential appreciation in 
return for a periodic payment. Indeed, investment banks sometimes 
issue exchangeable securities, not to hedge appreciated stock 
holdings, but to satisfy market demand.57 Hedge funds also value the 
differences between exchangeable securities and the underlying stock 
 
 56. See Schizer, supra note 12. Foreign investors might also favor these securities as an 
alternative to equity, which is subject to a withholding tax on dividends. Yet there is some risk 
that these exchangeable securities might also be subject to withholding tax, at least in some 
circumstances. In any event, anecdotal evidence suggests that these securities are sold primarily 
to U.S. investors. Id. 
 57. For instance, Morgan Stanley has issued a number of such deals off its “shelf” 
registration statement.  
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 09 Gentry.doc  9/11/03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 13:9 
 
because they can exploit these differences in various trading 
strategies that are discussed below.  
Since theory does not tell us whether generous pricing is needed, 
the key question is what data can reveal the answer. Short-term 
generous pricing can be ruled out if the price of the exchangeable 
does not rise relative to the price of the underlying stock. On the 
other hand, long-term mispricing is harder to pin down. In this 
regard, a spike in the underlying stock’s volume and short interest is 
only ambiguous evidence. The reason is that at least two trading 
strategies commonly used by hedge funds involve holding an 
exchangeable security and shorting the underlying stock, but do not 
necessarily depend on generous pricing. 
In the first strategy, hedge funds place bets on the volatility (as 
opposed to the direction) of the underlying stock price. In buying a 
DECS, the fund in effect buys an out-of-the-money call option 
(giving it opportunity for gain above 120% of the then-current market 
price) and sells an at-the-money put option (giving it risk of loss 
below the then-current market price). An increase in the underlying 
stock’s volatility increases the value of both these options (one of 
which is an asset to the fund, and the other of which is a liability). 
Typically, there will be more appreciation in the call (the asset), 
causing a net increase in the value of the DECS. This is true even if 
the stock price does not change or, for that matter, if the fund has 
hedged stock price changes by engaging in short sales, as is usually 
the case. Thus, “CBA [convertible bond arbitrage] managers are 
generally long volatility.”58 This strategy might be premised on 
 
 58. There is another way to extract volatility-related returns for convertible bonds that are 
principal-protected, but the strategy is harder to implement for exchangeable securities, which 
do not offer meaningful principal protection. The key lies in the “delta” of the security—that is, 
the amount the security’s price changes when the stock price changes by one dollar. See Hugh 
Burnaby-Atkins, Convertible Bond Arbitrage Relative Value Trading, ALTERNATIVE 
INVESTMENTS MGMT. ASS’N. NEWSL., Feb. 2002, available at http://www.aima.org/aimasite/ 
articles/Feb2002/BankofBermuda.pdf.  
 For principal-protected bonds, when the stock price is very low, so that a principal-
protected bond is unlikely to be converted, changes in the stock price will cause only modest 
changes in the bond’s value. On the other hand, when the stock price is very high, so that the 
bond is nearly certain to be converted, a dollar change in the stock price will cause essentially a 
dollar change in the bond’s value. Thus, the delta of these bonds increases as the stock price 
increases. As a result, when a hedge fund dynamically hedges a principal-protected bond, it will 
make money from imperfections in the hedge both when the stock price rises and when it falls. 
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generous pricing if, for instance, issuers discount the premium they 
charge for the option embedded in the exchangeable securities, a step 
the issuer might take to compensate holders for the relative 
complexity and illiquidity of these securities. However, it is also 
possible that the securities are fairly priced, given current market 
conditions, and fund managers are betting that market conditions will 
change (i.e., so volatility will increase). In the latter circumstance, 
exchangeable securities offer a relatively unique and liquid means of 
placing this bet, given that their term is three to five years. In 
contrast, most publicly-traded options have a term of less than one 
year.59  
In addition to bets on volatility, there is a second strategy in which 
hedge funds use short sales without necessarily relying on generous 
pricing. Using this strategy, hedge funds “strip the coupon” off a 
convertible security, in effect using a cheap source of funds to 
finance a low-risk return. For instance, assume the exchangeable 
security costs $100, as does the underlying stock. Assume also that 
the correlation in their trading prices (the so-called “delta”) is not 
perfect (i.e., because the exchangeable security does not pay holders 
the first 20% of opportunity for gain). Thus, when the security is first 
issued (for $100), a $1 change in the value of the underlying stock 
causes an 80¢ change in the value of the exchangeable security. 
Given this delta of 0.80, the hedge fund will hedge the security by 
shorting $80 worth of stock (i.e., 0.80 of a share). While the fund 
 
Consider, for example, a bond that is convertible into one share and offers principal protection 
of $100 (so the embedded call option has an exercise price of $100). Assuming the bond’s delta 
is 0.5 when the stock price is $100, the fund will hedge at this stock price by shorting one-half 
of a share for each bond. If the stock price rises to $105, the short sale will decline by $2.50, but 
the convertible bond will increase by more than $2.50 (because, by the time the stock price 
rises to $104, the bond’s delta is greater than 0.5). Correspondingly, if the stock price falls to 
$95, the short sale will appreciate by $2.50 but the bond will appreciate by less than $2.50 
(because, by the time the stock price falls to $96, the bond’s delta is less than 0.5).  
 The key to this strategy is that delta increases with the stock price. While this condition 
holds for principal-protected securities, it does not hold for the exchangeable securities in our 
study, which do not offer meaningful principal protection. On these securities, the delta is high 
when the stock price is either very low or very high, but it is lower when the stock price is 
between 100% and 120% of the security’s issue price (because the issuer retains opportunity for 
gain in this trading range). The strategy “works”—in the sense that it yields profits regardless of 
the market’s direction—only in trading ranges in which the delta is increasing.  
 59. There is a developing market in LEAPS, which have longer terms, but this market was 
relatively thin during the period for which we have data. See Schizer, supra note 2, at 1348. 
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does not have direct access to this $80 of short sale proceeds, the 
fund, as a valued high-volume customer of the broker that has 
implemented the short sale, will earn interest on the proceeds (a 
“short sale rebate”).60 In fact, the short sale rebate is likely to be 
high—only fifty basis points less than the hedge fund’s borrowing 
cost. On top of this negative spread, the fund will have to pay another 
fifty basis points to borrow the stock needed for the short sale. Thus, 
assuming (1) the fund has borrowed $80 toward purchasing the 
convertible bond and (2) the stock does not pay a dividend, this 
trading strategy has an annual carrying cost of only 80¢. In addition, 
the fund must put up $20 of its own capital to buy the exchangeable 
security. At the same time, the fund earns a coupon on the 
exchangeable security, which might be $4 per year. Net of expenses, 
the fund earns $3.20 on $20 of capital, or 16% per year. Since the net 
position is effectively a fixed income investment, the fund bears risk 
that interest rates or the issuer’s credit will change.  
Some of the profit in the coupon-stripping strategy may arise from 
overly generous pricing on the exchangeable security’s coupon. Yet 
some profit also arises from cheap financing the fund is able to 
secure. By shorting the stock, the hedge fund, in effect, is able to 
borrow short sale proceeds for one percent per year. The trick—
because the fund does not want to take market risk on this short 
sale—is to find an offsetting position that yields more than one 
percent per year. Obviously, an exchangeable security fits this bill, 
causing hedge funds to demand these securities. Coupon stripping is 
an especially attractive strategy with exchangeable securities because 
they do not offer principal protection, and thus make relatively high 
periodic payments. 
To sum up, there are reasons why generous pricing may not be 
needed for exchangeable securities, and evidence of a rise in the 
underlying stock’s volume and short interest could be consistent with 
this view.  
 
 60. This rebate is a crucial element of this trading strategy, and it would not be offered to 
less favored customers, such as most individual investors. 
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3. Empirical Evidence 
To test for abnormal trading volume, we regress the logarithm of 
the daily trading volume on the logarithm of shares outstanding for 
the underlying stock (taken from the CRSP data base), a set of 
transaction-specific constants, a set of transaction-specific 
sensitivities to overall market volume (as measured by the logarithm 
of daily volume on the New York Stock Exchange), and a set of 
dummy variables for the days in eleven-day windows centered on 
both the announcement and filing dates for the hedging security. The 
logarithm of shares outstanding captures the idea that equities with 
more shares outstanding will have higher volume. The deal-specific 
dummy variables allow each underlying stock to have its own 
average volume. The dummy variables for the windows around 
announcement and filing capture abnormal daily volume around the 
important dates for the hedging security. 
Table 5 reports the results. Specifically, the second column reports 
the abnormal trading volume around the filing date.61 On the filing 
date, volume in the underlying stock is almost double the normal 
volume, and, on the day after the filing date, volume is 140% greater 
than normal. This abnormally high volume starts just before the filing 
date, persists on the first day after the filing date, and decays 
thereafter. The two days preceding the filing date have excess volume 
of 38% and 36%, respectively. Volume is more than 60% above 
normal on the second and third days after the filing date, and is 45% 
above normal on the fourth and fifth trading days after the filing date. 
As noted above, though, an increase in volume is ambiguous 
evidence which is consistent with both generous pricing-related and 
nongenerous pricing-related trading.  
 
 
 61. The first column, which is less relevant to our hypothesis, shows trading volume both 
before and after the announcement day. This volume is roughly 25% below the average trading 
volume for the security. These daily differences are often statistically different from zero at the 
95% confidence level. These results suggest that trading volume in the underlying is slightly 
depressed (relative to earlier and later trading volume) around the announcement date. While 
the days surrounding the announcement have unusually low trading volume, the trading volume 
on the announcement day is very close to normal. 
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Table 5 
Excess Volume in the Underlying Stocks around Announcement and 
Filing Days 
 Announcement Day Filing Day 
Event – 5 days -0.075 (-0.77) 0.097 (0.87) 
Event - 4 days -0.081 (-0.89) 0.20 (1.84) 
Event - 3 days -0.15 (-1.52) 0.16 (1.94) 
Event - 2 days -0.28 (-3.08) 0.38 (3.59) 
Event - 1 day -0.25 (-2.98) 0.36 (3.91) 
Event day 0.096 (-0.81) 0.95 (8.13) 
Event + 1 day -0.40 (-4.09) 1.41 (9.83) 
Event + 2 days -0.24 (-2.32) 0.74 (6.80) 
Event + 3 days -0.25 (-2.84) 0.62 (5.93) 
Event + 4 days -0.18 (-1.86) 0.44 (4.35) 
Event + 5 days -0.16 (-1.40) 0.46 (4.50) 
Excess volume is listed as a fraction; t-statistics are in parentheses. The sample has 
sixty-one deals for which the underlying stock is publicly traded. Excess volume is 
calculated by regressing log volume on log shares outstanding for the underlying 
stock, a transaction-specific constant that allows each firm to have its own average 
volume, transaction-specific sensitivities to market volume, and dummy variables for 
each of the days in the two event windows. 
As a more specific test for convertible arbitrage activity, we 
examine the short interest on the underlying stock, both when the 
exchangeable security is issued and when it matures.62 Short interest 
data are reported on the fifteenth of each month from brokers. To 
measure changes in short interest, we compare the observation 
immediately after the issuance with the observation immediately 
before the issuance, and, to allow more time for hedge funds to act 
(and to avoid increases in anticipation of issuance), we compare short 
interest two observations after the issuance date with short interest 
two observations before the issuance date. As a simple measure of 
short interest, we measure whether short interest increases or 
decreases between the two comparison observations. 
We can obtain short interest data around the issuance of forty-five 
transactions. Using the observations immediately before and after the 
issue date, we find that thirty-six underlying stocks experience an 
 
 62. For more on short interest and arbitrage activity, see Averil Brent et al., Sheet Interest: 
Explanations and Tests, 25 J. FIN. AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 273 (1990). 
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increase in short interest activity and nine experience a decrease. We 
can reject the hypothesis of random increases and decreases (i.e., the 
null hypothesis of a 0.50 probability of an increase) at the 99% 
confidence level. When we use the longer horizon, we find that the 
short interest increases in thirty-nine of the forty-five transactions. 
This change provides compelling evidence that more investors short 
the stock after the exchangeable security is issued, which is 
consistent with convertible arbitrageurs shorting the stock (though 
ambiguous as to mispricing). 
An alternative explanation for increased short interest around the 
issue date is that news of the exchangeable security increases the 
pessimism of other investors, inducing them to short the underlying 
stock. To eliminate this information-based explanation, we examine 
the short interest around the maturity date. Since maturity is easy to 
predict and occurs well after the issue date, it is unlikely that maturity 
prompts any information-driven short sales. In contrast, maturity of 
the security will induce convertible arbitrageurs to unwind their short 
positions. In other words, even if a surge in short interest upon 
issuance is not definitive evidence of convertible arbitrage, a 
reduction in short interest at maturity is very strong evidence of this 
activity. 
The change in short interest at maturity is even more striking than 
at the issue date. Of the twenty-five transactions for which we have 
short interest data at maturity, over the one month horizon twenty-
three underlying stocks have a decrease in short interest. Using the 
two observation window, the number rises to twenty-four. In both 
cases, we can reject the null hypothesis that changes in the level of 
short sales are random. 
To test more directly for short-term generous pricing, we compare 
the initial returns on the exchangeable securities and underlying stock 
over the same period. Our methodology follows studies that look at 
underpricing of initial public offerings of stock. A key difference is 
the fact that our benchmark is not the overall market, but the 
underlying security (which, for almost all of the exchangeable 
securities, have the same initial value as the issue price of the 
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exchangeable security).63 While the exchangeable security and 
underlying stock offer somewhat different payoffs, they should trade 
in tandem when the underlying stock price fluctuates modestly near 
the initial offering date. Over time, however, larger discrepancies 
should arise due to different features of the two securities (e.g., the 
difference between the coupon and the dividend, the retention of 
upside potential by the issuer, the impending maturity date, etc.). 
For a sample of forty-two transactions, we identify trading data 
within two days of the filing date. We calculate the return on the 
exchangeable security as the difference between the offering price 
and the last traded price at the end of the first day of trading, the 
second trading day, and the third trading day. For these deals, the 
average returns on the exchangeable security over these three 
intervals (i.e., the third interval is a three-day return) are 1.21%, 
1.51%, and 1.78%, respectively. These returns indicate a positive 
return to the original owner of the exchangeable security. However, 
the returns on the underlying stock are also positive over these three 
intervals, with average returns of 0.66%, 1.27%, and 1.52%, 
respectively. Excess returns on the exchangeable securities over the 
three intervals, 0.55%, 0.24%, and 0.26%, are not statistically 
different from zero at conventional confidence levels. Thus, the 
evidence does not suggest that short-term holders benefit from 
mispricing. 
It is still possible that long-term holders benefit from 
underpricing, but it is not feasible to test for this effect directly. Over 
time, it becomes more difficult to compare returns of the 
exchangeable security and underlying stock because cash flows differ 
and non-linearities in the exchangeable security’s payoff become 
more important.64 Yet the fact that the underlying stock price declines 
when the exchangeable is issued, as noted above in Part III.C, is 
consistent with the idea that certain clienteles, who are relatively 
tolerant of complexity and illiquidity, sell their stock in order to buy 
 
 63. Given the nature of the exchangeable security, one would expect it to have similar 
exposure to market risk as the underlying stock. Thus, comparing the returns of the 
exchangeable security and the underlying stock implicitly controls for market risk. 
 64. Put another way, assessing long-term mispricing requires estimates of various 
parameters that inform the value of derivatives embedded in the securities. Uncertainty over 
these parameters complicates assessing long-term mispricing. 
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the exchangeable security. In other words, this substitution effect—
and not the market microstructure explanation offered in Part III.C—
may be responsible for some (or all) of this price decline. 
E. Other Constraints 
Three other frictions, which are not explored empirically here, can 
burden both an offering of exchangeable securities and an over-the-
counter transaction, but not a block or serial sale. In other words, 
these costs apply only to the tax-deferred alternatives, and burden 
these more or less equally. First, in order to avoid a current tax, the 
issuer must remain exposed to relatively modest fluctuations in the 
underlying stock, whether the issuer is hedging with exchangeable 
securities or over-the-counter derivatives.  
Second, corporate taxpayers that engage in complex financial 
transactions, including exchangeable securities and over-the-counter 
derivatives, may become subject to special market scrutiny, since 
investors can become concerned that they do not understand what the 
firms are doing. While this friction has become more significant in 
the wake of Enron’s failure, it was probably less important during the 
period that we study.  
Third, corporate taxpayers can face adverse financial accounting 
when hedging with an exchangeable security or an over-the-counter 
derivative. Financial Accounting Standard 133 (“FAS 133”), which 
became effective on July 1, 2000, requires firms periodically to report 
on accounting statements the fair market value of certain derivative 
positions.65 Depending upon the rule’s precise application, it could 
introduce undesirable volatility in the earnings of firms that hedge an 
appreciated stock position—volatility that does not accurately reflect 
the firm’s true economic position. The concern is that the firm would 
have to report changes in the value of the hedge, but could not also 
report offsetting changes in the underlying stock being hedged. As an 
illustration of this accounting mismatch, assume the hedged stock 
appreciates by 50%. Earnings do not reflect this gain because the 
stock is not being marked to market and has not been sold, but the 
 
 65. FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 
NO. 133: ACOUNTING FOR DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS AND HEDGING ACTIVITIES (1998). 
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earnings would reflect the corresponding loss on the derivative 
because it is being marked to market. The firm would thus appear 
unprofitable, even though no economic loss has occurred.  
To avoid this mismatch, firms will want their transactions to 
qualify for “hedge” accounting, a special rule within FAS 133 that, in 
effect, allows both positions—the hedge and the hedged asset—to be 
marked to market. In the example above, losses on the hedging 
transaction would be offset by gains on the hedged asset, so no 
accounting loss would be recorded. Yet hedge accounting is not 
always available. For example, one prerequisite for hedge accounting 
is a relatively close correlation between the hedge and hedged asset.66 
However, for tax reasons the taxpayer will not want the correlation to 
be too close, or the hedge will trigger a taxable constructive sale.67 
F. The Advantage of Private Transactions 
Thus far, we have documented costs that arise in exchangeable 
securities offerings but not in private over-the-counter transactions. 
Our findings help explain the market’s preference for private 
transactions, a preference previously established only through 
anecdotal evidence.68 
While the purpose of this paper is positive, rather than normative, 
our findings have (modest) implications for reform. For instance, as 
one of us has written elsewhere, private transactions are vulnerable to 
government responses that would not reach public exchangeable 
offerings.69 The extra costs of public transactions documented here 
 
 66. See id. at 11-12 (requiring, as condition for qualifying as fair value hedge, that “the 
hedging relationship be expected to be highly effective in achieving offsetting changes in fair 
value”). 
 67. See Schizer, supra note 2, at 1341-42. 
 68. Obviously, empirical research on private transactions would allow for a more 
definitive judgment (e.g., in assessing costs that might arise in private deals but not in public 
ones), but data limitations are a significant obstacle. For a detailed anecdotal survey of costs 
associated with private deals, see id. at 1347-56. 
 69. See id.  The main vulnerability of private transactions is that dealers ordinarily hedge 
the derivatives they have sold to clients, typically by engaging in short sales in the public 
market. In contrast, the counterparty in public exchangeable offerings is a public investor—not 
a dealer—and thus does not necessarily need to hedge. To implement the requisite short sales, 
dealers must borrow the underlying stock. In large transactions, dealers usually want to borrow 
the taxpayer’s stock. Yet this step weakens the tax analysis, and the government could easily 
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suggest that, at least in marginal cases, taxpayers would not substitute 
public transactions for private ones if the government targeted the 
private transactions. Yet in other cases, such substitutions might well 
occur, triggering added social waste as inframarginal taxpayers use 
more expensive hedges. The evidence in the next section suggests 
one reason why such substitutions are likely: The tax savings from 
exchangeable offerings can outweigh the costs—a fact that (perhaps 
not surprisingly) seems true of the deals in our sample. 
IV. TAXPAYER STOCK PRICE AND THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF 
EXCHANGEABLE OFFERINGS 
In this Part, we explore whether the taxpayer’s stock price rises 
when an exchangeable offering is announced.70 Such a market vote of 
confidence would imply that the tax savings or other benefits from 
these transactions outweighed the costs. A caveat is in order, though. 
The market is reacting not only to the decision to hedge and raise 
money, but also to possible uses of the proceeds. In our sample, 
issuers typically say they will use proceeds for “general corporate 
purposes,” so we are unable to test whether announcement effects are 
related to the use of proceeds.71 The fact that proceeds are not 
typically earmarked, though, suggests that the new information is the 
combination of the hedge and the financing, rather than the specific 
use of proceeds. 
 
use regulatory authority to prevent this borrowing of stock. See id. at 1338. 
 70. Obviously, we cannot test trust-based transactions in this way because we cannot 
measure the market value of the taxpayer who hedges through the trust.  
 71. While the most commonly-stated use of proceeds for corporate issuers is “general 
corporate purposes,” press accounts sometimes link the securities issuance to new investment 
initiatives or the retirement of other debt. In the case of Alliant Energy’s PHONES transaction 
based on McLeodUSA, managers felt that the market did not recognize the value of Alliant’s 
investment; over the thirteen month period before issuing the security, McLeodUSA’s stock 
appreciated by almost 400% but Alliant’s stock price fell by 3%. See Paul Sherer, Alliant 
Energy Is Seeking to Cash in on McLeodUSA Stake with Bond Deal, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 
2000, at C24. Alliant’s position in McLeodUSA was worth $2.6 billion and accounted for over 
half of Alliant’s market capitalization. The PHONES transaction hedged roughly 15% of this 
position. Thus, in this example, the managers hoped the news would focus on the value they 
could realize from their portfolio investment in addition to the possible uses of funds. As an 
aside, while Alliant’s managers faulted investors for not appreciating the value of McLeodUSA, 
the subsequent stock performance suggests Alliant’s investors may have been clairvoyant. By 
the end of 2001, McLeodUSA’s stock traded at a price below its value in December of 1998. 
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A. Announcement Effects for Issuers of Exchangeable Securities 
To examine announcement effects on the issuer’s stock, we run an 
event study like the one we ran for the underlying stock. However, 
we make several changes. First, we focus solely on announcement 
effects since execution of the offering is unlikely to have a direct 
effect on the issuer. Second, to capture the possibility that changes in 
the underlying stock have a direct valuation effect on the issuer, we 
include the daily abnormal returns for the underlying stock. We 
measure these abnormal returns as the residuals from a market model 
for each underlying stock. We allow the responsiveness of the 
issuer’s stock to the underlying stock to differ after the issuance of 
the hedging security. One would expect that the issuer’s stock would 
be less sensitive to the underlying stock after issuing the 
exchangeable security. We also include a separate dummy variable 
that captures returns after the issuance of the exchangeable security. 
The first column of Table 6 presents the average abnormal return 
for each of the eleven days in the announcement period. On the 
announcement day, the issuer has an abnormal return of 0.88%, 
which is statistically different from zero at the 95% confidence level. 
Thus, the market responds positively when exchangeable offerings 
are announced. As expected, the issuer’s stock is positively related to 
idiosyncratic movements in the underlying stock. Before the 
issuance, a 1% abnormal return for the underlying stock would be 
associated with a 0.061% additional return for the issuer. However, 
after hedging, this sensitivity is reduced by about one-third (i.e., the 
coefficient on the interaction term with the dummy variable for days 
after the security is issued is -0.020) and this reduction is statistically 
different from zero at the 95% confidence level.72 
 
 72. Three factors explain why the issuer’s exposure to risk in the underlying remains 
positive after the security is issued. First, some of the issuers are in the same industry as the 
underlying so the coefficient also captures industry-specific influences. Second, the securities 
do not offer a perfect hedge. Third, some issuers only hedge part of their position in the 
underlying. 
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Table 6 
Returns for Issuer around Announcement Date 
 Average 
Abnormal 
Return 
 
t-statistic 
Median 
Abnormal 
Return 
 
Percent 
Positive 
Event - 5 days -0.48 (-1.12) -0.23 40.5 
Event - 4 days 0.080 (0.19) -0.13 40.5 
Event - 3 days 0.47 (1.12) -0.25 45.9 
Event - 2 days 0.68 (1.60) -0.15 48.6 
Event - 1 day -0.35 (-0.82) -0.36 40.5 
Event day 0.88 (2.08) 0.47 62.2 
Event + 1 day 0.27 (0.63) -0.37 40.5 
Event + 2 days -0.23 (-0.54) -0.056 48.6 
Event + 3 days 0.065 (0.15) -0.12 45.9 
Event + 4 days -0.35 (-0.83) -0.33 29.7 
Event + 5 days -0.13 (-0.31) -0.041 48.6 
Residual on 
underlying 
0.061 (8.85)   
Residual on 
underlying * After 
issuance dummy 
-0.020 (-2.39)   
After issuance 
dummy 
-0.0008 (-1.23)   
Excess returns are listed as percentages; t-statistics are in parentheses. The sample has 
thirty-seven deals. The excess returns are calculated using a market model. For the 
percent positive, given the sample size, the 95% confidence interval around the null 
hypothesis of 50.0% positive is [33.8%, 66.2%]. 
B. Comparison with Announcement Effects of Similar Transactions 
While Table 6 documents a modest positive market response to 
the issuance of an exchangeable offering, a natural question is how 
this reaction compares to similar financings. The most well-known 
announcement effect for financings is the negative effect of a 
seasoned equity offering, a result that is consistent with managers 
issuing shares when the firm’s equity is overvalued. This signaling 
story is analogous to our finding that an exchangeable offering 
contains a negative signal about the underlying stock. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 09 Gentry.doc  9/11/03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 13:9 
 
For announcement effects on the issuer’s stock, in contrast, three 
other transactions may provide a closer analogy: (1) classic (principal 
protected) exchangeable debt; (2) asset securitization; and (3) an 
asset sale.73 For classic exchangeable debt, Ghosh et al. find a trivial 
(0.04%) abnormal return for the announcement window,74 and Barber 
finds a similar result.75  
For asset securitizations (usually associated with issuing a 
financial security backed by the returns to a loan or credit card 
portfolio), Thomas finds a 0.24% excess return on the announcement 
day.76 He attributes this increase in value to the issuer’s improved 
ability to put assets to productive use.77 For example, many large 
financial institutions have a comparative advantage at originating 
loans rather than just holding them. In contrast, Lockwood et al. use 
earlier data and find no statistical evidence of abnormal returns for 
securitizations, except for a positive announcement effect of 2.79% 
for specialized finance companies (as opposed to banks or 
automobile companies).78  
Finally, Lang et al., among others, examine the announcement 
effects of asset sales and find a mean abnormal return of 1.41%.79 
Allen and McConnell find a positive three-day announcement effect 
of 1.90% for a sample of equity carve-outs.80 Both of these studies 
find that the positive effects are larger for firms that pay out the 
proceeds of these transactions either to shareholders or creditors. In 
contrast, they reject the idea that these sales create value by enabling 
 
 73. The issuance of convertible debt shares some features with exchangeable securities 
but is more likely just another form of issuing equity. Consistent with this story, studies of 
convertible debt find roughly a −2.0% abnormal return upon announcement. See Abhay 
Abhyankar & Alison Dunning, Wealth Effects of Convertible Bond and Convertible Preference 
Share Issues: An Empirical Analysis of the UK Market, 23 J. BANKING & FIN. 1043, 1056 
(1999). 
 74. Ghosh et al., supra note 8, at 258. 
 75. Barber, supra note 8, at 53. 
 76. Hugh Thomas, A Preliminary Look at Gains from Asset Securitization, 9 J. INT’L FIN. 
MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS AND MONEY 321 (1999). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Larry J. Lockwood et al., Wealth Effects of Asset Securitization, 20 J. BANKING & FIN. 
152, 157 (1996). 
 79. Larry Lang et al., Asset Sales, Firm Performance and the Agency Costs of Managerial 
Discretion, 37 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 13 (1995). 
 80. Jeffrey W. Allen & John J. McConnell, Equity Carve-Outs and Managerial 
Discretion, 53 J. FIN. 173 (1998). 
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firms to reallocate cash to better investment opportunities within the 
firm. We cannot conduct an analogous test because, as noted, we lack 
information about the use of proceeds for a significant portion of our 
sample. 
In summary, the positive announcement effect here is larger than 
the effect found for classic exchangeable debt or asset securitizations, 
but smaller than the effect found for asset sales and equity carve-outs. 
While the precise source of this positive reaction is unknowable, it 
may be that shareholders value the fact that exposure to an over-
valued stock has been reduced without triggering a capital gains tax.  
V. CONCLUSION 
This study is the first attempt to quantify costs associated with 
tax-free hedging. We identify two significant frictions that burden 
public exchangeable offerings but not private transactions. One 
disadvantage, as to which our empirical evidence is ambiguous, is 
that the investors may demand a discount for the relative complexity 
and illiquidity of these securities. This study shows that there is no 
short-term mispricing, but leaves open the possibility of long-term 
mispricing.  
Another key disadvantage of exchangeable securities is the market 
attention they attract. By announcing a hedge in advance and then 
implementing it all at once, as typically occurs in exchangeable 
securities offerings, taxpayers can expect to lose approximately 5% 
of their appreciated stock’s value (although, as noted, some of this 
cost is avoided if the issuer is not perceived to have unique 
information). When added to a 3% underwriting fee, this cost may 
well exceed the economic benefit of the tax deferral. Since this extra 
5% can be avoided with over-the-counter transactions, these private 
deals offer a significant advantage. Thus, this study sheds light on 
reasons why private transactions often are preferred.  
Finally, the study reveals a modest but statistically significant 
increase in a publicly-traded taxpayer’s stock price when one of these 
transactions is announced. This finding suggests that, in general, the 
market believes the issuer’s tax savings or other benefits from these 
transactions outweigh the issuer’s costs.  
In light of these three findings, it seems likely that private 
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transactions are a greater threat to the tax base than public 
exchangeable offerings. Yet the public deals would remain a viable 
alternative for at least some taxpayers if a legal reform rendered 
private transactions more difficult. 
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF TRANSACTIONS 
 
 
Issuer: American Express Underlying Stock: First Data 
Corp. 
Security type: DECS Offering Amount: $771.8 million 
Issue Date: 10/7/93  Maturity date: 10/15/96 
Details of acquisition of underlying: Prior to April 1992, First Data 
was a wholly-owned subsidiary of American Express. In April 
1992, American Express had an initial public offering (“IPO”) and 
retained 55% of First Data’s stock. In March 1993, American 
Express made a secondary offering of First Data stock, after which 
American Express owned 22% of First Data’s stock. 
 
Issuer: First Chicago Underlying Stock: NEXTEL 
Security type: DECS Offering Amount: $235.6 
million 
Issue Date: 2/8/94 Maturity date: 2/15/97 
Details of acquisition of underlying: First Chicago made a venture 
capital investment in NEXTEL. 
 
Issuer: ARCO Underlying Stock: Lyondell 
Security type: Exchangeable 
Notes 
Offering Amount: $866.3 
million 
Issue Date: 8/1/94 Maturity date: 9/15/97 
Details of acquisition of underlying: Prior to 1989, Lyondell was 
first a division and then a wholly-owned subsidiary of ARCO. 
ARCO took Lyondell public in 1989. As of August 1994, ARCO 
owned 49.9% of Lyondell’s stock (39.9 million shares). The 
exchangeable notes may be exchanged into as many as 39.9 million 
shares. 
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Issuer: Pier 1 Underlying Stock: General Host 
Security type: Exchangeable 
Debentures 
Offering Amount: $12.5 million 
Issue Date: 12/5/94 Maturity date: 12/1/00 
Details of acquisition of underlying: In April 1993, Pier 1 acquired 
over 2 million shares of General Host from the sale of its 49.5% 
interest in Sunbelt Nursery Group. Pier 1 bought Sunbelt Nursery 
from Tandy Corp. in 1975, after which Sunbelt Nursery was a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of Pier 1. In 1985, Pier 1 split into three 
companies and Sunbelt Nursery became a separately-traded entity. 
In September 1990, Pier 1 purchased 50.4% of Sunbelt Nursery 
from Pier 1’s largest shareholder, Intermark, at the price of $12 per 
share. In November 1990, Pier 1 completed an acquisition of the 
remaining shares in the firm for $12 per share. In October 1991, 
Pier 1 sold 40.2% of Sunbelt Nursery’s stock to the public at $8.50 
per share; it further reduced its stake in Sunbelt Nursery in 1992. 
 
Issuer: Sprint Underlying Stock: SNET 
Security type: DECS Offering Amount: $124.3 million 
Issue Date: 3/20/95 Maturity date: 3/31/00 
Details of acquisition of underlying: Sprint acquired SNET stock 
from AT&T in the early 1980s. 
 
Issuer: Allstate Corporation Underlying Stock: PMI Group 
Security type: Exchangeable 
Notes 
Offering Amount: $340.5 million 
Issue Date: 4/10/95 Maturity date: 4/15/98 
Details of acquisition of underlying: Prior to the transaction, PMI 
was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Allstate. The DECS-like 
exchangeable notes were issued concurrently with the IPO of PMI. 
The DECS represented 38.6% of the stock of PMI. 
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Issuer: Merrill Lynch Underlying Stock: MGIC Invst. 
Co. 
Security type: STRYPES Offering Amount: $240.0 
million 
Issue Date: 7/20/95 Maturity date: 8/15/98 
Details of acquisition of underlying: This deal monetized half of 
Northwestern Mutual’s stake in MGIC Investment Corp. In 1984, 
Northwestern Mutual Life acquired 90% of MGIC’s equity in a 
management buyout for MGIC from its parent, Baldwin-United. 
Northwestern Mutual Life invested $250 million. MGIC went 
public in 1991 with Northwestern Mutual Life selling shares that 
reduced its stake in MGIC to 61%. Subsequent secondary offerings 
reduced Northwestern Mutual Life’s ownership stake to 20%. 
 
Issuer: Houghton Mifflin Underlying Stock: INSO Corp. 
Security type: SAILS Offering Amount: $119.0 
million 
Issue Date: 7/27/95 Maturity date: 8/1/99 
Details of acquisition of underlying: InfoSoft (later renamed INSO) 
began operations as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Houghton-
Mifflin in 1982. In March 1994, Houghton Mifflin sold 60.4% of 
its stake in INSO through an IPO. Concurrent with the SAILS 
offering, a secondary offering of INSO stock sold 600,000 of 
Houghton Mifflin’s shares in INSO, which reduced Houghton 
Mifflin’s position to 35.9%. 
 
Issuer: Time Warner Trust Underlying Stock: HASBRO, 
Inc. 
Security type: PERCS Offering Amount: $373.8 
million 
Issue Date: 8/9/95 Maturity date: 12/23/97 
Details of acquisition of underlying: Time Warner acquired Hasbro 
stock in 1983 both through exchanges for businesses and direct 
purchases of shares. 
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Issuer: Laidlaw One Underlying Stock: US Filter 
Security type: Exchangeable 
Notes 
Offering Amount: $63.0 million 
Issue Date: 11/22/95 Maturity date: 12/31/00 
Details of acquisition of underlying: Laidlaw acquired the shares in 
US Filter in September 1994 as a result of the sale of its interest in 
its former Italian water engineering firm. 
 
Issuer: Jefferson Pilot Underlying Stock: NationsBank 
Security type: ACES Offering Amount: $119.6 million 
Issue Date: 11/27/95 Maturity date: 1/21/00 
Details of acquisition of underlying: Jefferson Pilot’s equity 
position in Nationsbank was the largest position in its equity 
portfolio. It is unclear when Jefferson Pilot acquired Nationsbank 
stock. Jefferson Pilot used the proceeds to retire debt associated 
with its acquisition of the Alexander Hamilton Life Insurance 
Company. 
 
Issuer: US WEST Underlying Stock: Enhance 
Financial Services 
Security type: DECS Offering Amount: $117.6 million 
Issue Date: 12/6/95 Maturity date: 12/15/98 
Details of acquisition of underlying: In May 1988, US West 
purchased 20.3 percent of Enhance Financial Services, Inc. and 
21.7% of Securities Guaranty, Inc. for $50 million. 
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Issuer: Enron Corp. Underlying Stock: Enron Oil & 
Gas 
Security type: Exchangeable 
Notes 
Offering Amount: $217.5 
million 
Issue Date: 12/8/95 Maturity date: 12/13/98 
Details of acquisition of underlying: These exchangeable notes 
were part of Enron’s plan to divest part of its position in Enron Oil 
& Gas, of which it owned 53% before the transaction. Enron Oil & 
Gas concurrently announced a secondary equity issue in which 
Enron would sell 21.6 million shares of Enron Oil & Gas. Before 
its IPO in 1989, Enron Oil & Gas was a wholly-owned subsidiary 
of Enron Corp. 
 
Issuer: Cooper Industries Underlying Stock: Wyman-
Gordon 
Security type: DECS Offering Amount: $202.5 
million 
Issue Date: 12/14/95 Maturity date: 1/1/99 
Details of acquisition of underlying: In May 1994, Cooper acquired 
shares in Wyman-Gordon in exchange for its common stock of 
Cameron Forged Products. 
 
Issuer: Times Mirror Underlying Stock: Netscape 
Security type: PEPS Offering Amount: $51.2 million 
Issue Date: 3/13/96 Maturity date: 3/15/01 
Details of acquisition of underlying: In April 1995, Times Mirror 
invested $4 million in Netscape Communications (before its IPO). 
At the time of the offering, this position was worth $92 million. 
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Issuer: Merrill Lynch Underlying Stock: Cox Comm. 
Security type: STRYPES Offering Amount: $194.4 
million 
Issue Date: 5/22/96 Maturity date: 6/1/99 
Details of acquisition of underlying: Cox Enterprises, the privately-
held majority owner of Cox Communications, issued a private 
security with Merrill Lynch to monetize a small portion of its 
position in Cox. 
 
Issuer: Merrill Lynch Underlying Stock: SunAmerica 
Security type: STRYPES Offering Amount: $169.1 million 
Issue Date: 6/6/96 Maturity date: 6/15/99 
Details of acquisition of underlying: Mr. Broad was the chairman 
and chief executive officer of SunAmerica. His position in the 
company had grown over time due to executive compensation 
programs. 
 
Issuer: Merrill Lynch Underlying Stock: IMC Global 
Security type: STRYPES Offering Amount: $216.5 
million 
Issue Date: 7/2/96 Maturity date: 7/1/01 
Details of acquisition of underlying: GAMI, a privately-owned 
company whose chair is Sam Zell, obtained shares in IMC Global 
when IMC Global acquired Vigoro Corporation in November 1995. 
GAMI had owned 20% of Vigoro; after the merger, GAMI held 7% 
of IMC Global’s stock. Mr. Zell helped create Vigoro by buying 
other firm’s assets on the cheap. At the time of the merger, Vigoro 
stock was selling at more than four times the price at its 1991 IPO. 
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Issuer: Salomon Inc. Underlying Stock: Cincinnati 
Bell 
Security type: DECS Offering Amount: $195.1 
million 
Issue Date: 11/14/96 Maturity date: 2/1/01 
Details of acquisition of underlying: Western and Southern Life 
Insurance backed Salomon’s issuance of the DECS. Western and 
Southern Life Insurance began acquiring Cincinnati Bell stock in 
1983. A significant portion of its investment came from the 
conversion of convertible preferred shares that had a conversion 
price of $16. When the exchangeable debt was issued, Cincinnati 
Bell’s share price was $50. 
 
Issuer: Worthington Underlying Stock: Rouge Steel 
Security type: DECS Offering Amount: $81.3 million 
Issue Date: 2/27/97 Maturity date: 3/1/00 
Details of acquisition of underlying: Rouge Steel was started in the 
1920s as a subsidiary of Ford Motor Co. Ford sold 80% of Rouge 
Steel in a leveraged buyout in 1989. The buyers in 1989 were Carl 
Valdiserri, Worthington Steel, and Chase Manhattan Capital. In 
1992, Rouge acquired Ford’s remaining 20% stake. In 1994, Rouge 
held an IPO, at which point Chase Manhattan Capital sold its 
shares. 
 
Issuer: Nextel Trust Underlying Stock: Nextel 
Communications 
Security type: STRYPES Offering Amount: $100.3 
million 
Issue Date: 3/4/97 Maturity date: 5/15/00 
Details of acquisition of underlying: This trust-based deal is based 
on Nextel shares owned by two investment vehicles, both of which 
are owned by Telecom Ventures. Telecom Ventures is a private 
equity firm. 
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Issuer: ACES Trust II Underlying Stock: Republic 
Industries 
Security type: TRACES Offering Amount: $207.7 
million 
Issue Date: 5/29/97 Maturity date: 5/15/00 
Details of acquisition of underlying: This trust-based deal is based 
on Republic Industries shares owned by a group of 14 different 
shareholders. The contracting shareholders are a mix of corporate 
and individual investors; however, some of the backing shares 
come from trusts or IRA accounts. 
 
Issuer: Houston Industries Underlying Stock: Time Warner 
Security type: ACES Offering Amount: $918.8 
million 
Issue Date: 7/9/97 Maturity date: 7/1/00 
Details of acquisition of underlying: In 1995, Houston Industries 
received Time Warner stock as part of the consideration in the sale 
of its cable television business to Time Warner. 
 
Issuer: Ralston Purina Underlying Stock: Interstate 
Bakeries 
Security type: SAILS Offering Amount: $420 million 
Issue Date: 7/23/97 Maturity date: 8/1/00 
Details of acquisition of underlying: In July 1995, Ralston Purina 
received shares of International Baking Co. as part of the 
consideration for its wholly-owned subsidiary, Continental Baking 
Co. 
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Issuer: Mand. Exch. Trust (Banc 
One) 
Underlying Stock: FirstPlus 
Financial 
Security type: TIMES Offering Amount: $97.8 million 
Issue Date: 9/12/97 Maturity date: 8/15/00 
Details of acquisition of underlying: Financial press accounts report 
that Banc One’s basis in its FirstPlus Financial Group stock is 
about $7 per share (compared to a share price of $48 when the 
security was issued). It is unclear how Banc One, an investment 
bank, acquired the FirstPlus stock. However, a portion of the 
position is non-voting convertible stock (which can be converted 
only by a shareholder other than Banc One), so it is unlikely that 
the entire position was purchased in market transactions. 
 
Issuer: Snyder Trust Underlying Stock: Snyder 
Comm. 
Security type: STRYPES Offering Amount: $116.2 
million 
Issue Date: 9/18/97 Maturity date: 11/15/00 
Details of acquisition of underlying: In this trust-based deal, the 
Snyder family (including Daniel Snyder, the CEO of Snyder 
Communications) and other large (presumably inside) investors 
were the shareholders whose shares backed the STRYPES Trust. At 
the same time as the STRYPES issue, Snyder Communications 
raised money by issuing equity and other large shareholders sold 
stock in a secondary offering. 
 
Issuer: DECS Trust Underlying Stock: DIMON Inc. 
Security type: DECS Offering Amount: $73.2 million 
Issue Date: 9/25/97 Maturity date: 8/15/00 
Details of acquisition of underlying: In this trust-based deal, the 
Monk family backed the 3.1 million shares of DIMON stock in the 
DECS trust. At the same time, the family sold 1.8 million shares of 
DIMON stock in a secondary offering. The family had obtained the 
shares in the April 1995 merger of Dibrell Bros., Inc. and Monk-
Austin. 
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Issuer: WBK Trust Underlying Stock: Westpac 
Security type: STRYPES Offering Amount: $909.2 
million 
Issue Date: 9/30/97 Maturity date: 11/15/00 
Details of acquisition of underlying: AMP Society (an Australian 
financial services and insurance company) backed this trust-based 
STRYPES issue. Westpac Banking is an Australian bank but has 
ADRs that trade on the NYSE. AMP and Westpac formed a 
strategic alliance in 1990 which resulted in AMP owning 14.9% of 
Westpac’s stock. The strategic alliance was dissolved in 1995. 
 
Issuer: Merrill Lynch Underlying Stock: CIBER, Inc. 
Security type: STRYPES Offering Amount: $94.7 million 
Issue Date: 1/26/98 Maturity date: 2/1/01 
Details of acquisition of underlying: Bobby G. Stevenson, chairman 
and chief executive officer of CIBER, backed Merrill Lynch’s 
issuance of the STRYPES Trust. As of December 31, 1997, 
Stevenson owned approximately 27% of CIBER’s stock. The 
STRYPES Trust represents about one-third of his stake in the firm. 
 
Issuer: Reader’s Digest Ass’n. Underlying Stock: Reader’s 
Digest Ass’n. 
Security type: TRACES Offering Amount: $241.6 
million 
Issue Date: 2/10/98 Maturity date: 2/15/01 
Details of acquisition of underlying: This trust-based transaction 
enabled six charitable organizations to monetize a portion of their 
Reader’s Digest common stock in a public hybrid equity offering. 
Before Reader’s Digest went public in 1990, Reader’s Digest stock 
was a substantial portion of these six organizations’ investments. 
Notably, two other charitable organizations did not participate in 
the TRACES. The TRACES allowed the organizations to continue 
the diversification strategies that they began when Reader’s Digest 
went public. The deferral of capital gains taxes is probably not the 
motive for this transaction because the charitable organizations are 
tax exempt. 
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Issuer: DECS Trust III Underlying Stock: Herbalife 
International. 
Security type: DECS Offering Amount: $115.0 
million 
Issue Date: 3/25/98 Maturity date: 2/15/01 
Details of acquisition of underlying: This trust-based transaction 
was backed by Mark Hughes, founder and president of Herbalife 
International. 
 
Issuer: CVS ACES Trust Underlying Stock: CVS 
Corporation 
Security type: TRACES Offering Amount: $223 million 
Issue Date: 5/21/98 Maturity date: 5/15/01 
Details of acquisition of underlying: Eugene Applebaum backed 
this trust-based transaction. Mr. Applebaum acquired his CVS 
shares as part of the merger of CVS and Arbor Drugs in March 
1998. The stock-for-stock transaction was valued at $1.48 billion. 
Mr. Applebaum founded Arbor Drugs with a single store in 1962. 
He was appointed to the Board of Directors of CVS after the 
merger. 
 
Issuer: Dollar General Trust Underlying Stock: Dollar 
General 
Security type: STRYPES Offering Amount: $295.8 
million 
Issue Date: 5/21/98 Maturity date: 5/15/01 
Details of acquisition of underlying: Cal Turner, chairmen and 
CEO of Dollar General, backed this trust-based transaction. At the 
exchange date, the shares in the transaction could reduce the Turner 
family’s stake in Dollar General from 23% to 18%. 
 
Issuer: Estee Lauder Trust Underlying Stock: Estee Lauder 
Security type: TRACES Offering Amount: $248.1 
million 
Issue Date: 6/21/98 Maturity date: 6/5/01 
Details of acquisition of underlying: Shares owned by members of 
the Lauder family backed this trust-based transaction. 
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Issuer: Tribune Co. Underlying Stock: Learning Co. 
Security type: DECS Offering Amount: $128.5 
million 
Issue Date: 7/30/98 Maturity date: 8/15/01 
Details of acquisition of underlying: In December 1995, Tribune 
acquired shares in the Learning Co. in exchange for its former 
wholly-owned subsidiaries, Compton’s NewMedia and Compton’s 
Learning Co. Tribune had acquired Compton’s from Encyclopedia 
Britannica in July 1993 for $57 million in cash. 
 
Issuer: MediaOne Underlying Stock: AirTouch 
Security type: DECS Offering Amount: $162.5 
million 
Issue Date: 2/9/99 Maturity date: 2/15/02 
Details of acquisition of underlying: In April 1988, MediaOne sold 
its wireless communications business to AirTouch for shares of 
AirTouch stock. 
 
Issuer: DECS Trust IV Underlying Stock: Maxtor Corp. 
Security type: DECS Offering Amount: $162.5 
million 
Issue Date: 2/9/99 Maturity date: 2/15/02 
Details of acquisition of underlying: Maxtor announced a 
secondary offering. The company sold 7.8 million shares and 
Hyundai Electronics America sold 3.2 million shares. In addition, 
through a trust-based transaction, Hyundai backed exchangeable 
debt that could result in selling another 12.5 million shares. 
Hyundai acquired the Maxtor stock in August 1993 as part of a 
strategic alliance between the two firms. Hyundai invested $150 
million in Maxtor in exchange for 19.4 million Maxtor shares (a 
price of $7.70 per share), representing 40% of Maxtor’s shares. In 
November 1995, Maxtor accepted Hyundai’s bid to buy the rest of 
the company for $6.70 per share. In June 1998, Hyundai sold 
Maxtor shares to the public in an IPO. 
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Issuer: Estee Lauder Trust II Underlying Stock: Estee Lauder 
Security type: TRACES Offering Amount: $150.0 
million 
Issue Date: 2/17/99  Maturity date: 2/23/02 
Details of acquisition of underlying: Shares owned by members of 
the Lauder family backed this trust-based transaction. 
 
Issuer: Comcast Underlying Stock: AT&T 
Security type: PHONES Offering Amount: $718.3 
million 
Issue Date: 3/11/99 Maturity date: 5/15/29 
Details of acquisition of underlying: Comcast received AT&T 
shares in AT&T’s March 1999 acquisition of TCI. Comcast 
acquired its stock in TCI through various partnerships and joint 
ventures. 
 
Issuer: Tribune Co. Underlying Stock: America 
Online 
Security type: PHONES Offering Amount: $1.1 billion 
Issue Date: 4/7/99 Maturity date: 5/15/29 
Details of acquisition of underlying: In October 1991, the Tribune 
Co. took a minority position in AOL, which was then a privately-
held company. The Tribune Co. bought 512,000 shares for $5 
million (a price of less than $10 per share). Given AOL’s three 
subsequent two-for-one splits, this $5 million position represents 
over half of the 7 million AOL shares owned by Tribune at the 
issuance of the PHONES. AOL’s share price was $157 when the 
PHONES were issued. 
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Issuer: Amdocs Trust Underlying Stock: Amdocs Ltd. 
Security type: TRACES Offering Amount: $224.4 
million 
Issue Date: 6/7/99 Maturity date: 6/11/02 
Details of acquisition of underlying: This trust-based transaction 
was backed by inside shareholders. The TRACES represented 10 
million shares. At the same time, Amdocs announced a secondary 
offering by existing shareholders of 18 million shares and issued 2 
million new shares. 
 
Issuer: Southwest Sec. Group Underlying Stock: 
Knight/Trimark Group 
Security type: DARTS Offering Amount: $50.0 million 
Issue Date: 6/11/99 Maturity date: 6/30/04 
Details of acquisition of underlying: In May 1997, Roundtable 
Partners transformed itself from a private company owned by 
management and 27 broker-dealers into Knight/Trimark, a public 
company. In addition to raising capital through the IPO, the broker-
dealers, including Southwest Securities, received shares in 
Knight/Trimark. 
 
Issuer: Kerr-McGee Underlying Stock: Devon 
Energy 
Security type: DECS Offering Amount: $287.3 
million 
Issue Date: 7/27/99 Maturity date: 8/2/04 
Details of acquisition of underlying: In October 1996, Kerr-McGee 
acquired stock in Devon Energy in exchange for its North 
American onshore oil and gas fields. 
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Issuer: DECS Trust V Underlying Stock: Crown Castle 
Security type: DECS Offering Amount: $95.6 million 
Issue Date: 8/6/99 Maturity date: 8/15/02 
Details of acquisition of underlying: This trust-based transaction 
was backed by Robert Crown, a non-executive board member in 
Crown Castle. Before 1998, Mr. Crown had operational 
responsibilities at the firm. 
 
Issuer: Enron Corp. Underlying Stock: Enron Oil & 
Gas 
Security type: Exch. Notes Offering Amount: $222.5 
million 
Issue Date: 8/10/99 Maturity date: 7/31/02 
Details of acquisition of underlying: Before its IPO in 1989, Enron 
Oil & Gas (EOG) was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Enron Corp. 
In July 1999, Enron announced that it would exchange 62 million 
of its 82 million EOG shares for EOG’s interest in several foreign 
investments. After this transaction, EOG would be renamed EOG 
Resources. To dispose of its remaining EOG shares, Enron offered 
shares in a secondary offering concurrent to the issuance of the 
exchangeable debt. 
 
Issuer: Reliant Energy Underlying Stock: Time Warner 
Security type: ZENS Offering Amount: $1.0 billion 
Issue Date: 9/15/99 Maturity date: 9/15/29 
Details of acquisition of underlying: In 1995, Houston Industries 
received Time Warner stock as part of the consideration in the sale 
of its cable television business to Time Warner. 
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Issuer: Comcast Underlying Stock: Sprint PCS 
Security type: ZONES Offering Amount: $1.0 billion 
Issue Date: 10/12/99 Maturity date: 10/15/29 
Details of acquisition of underlying: In September 1996, Sprint 
entered into a joint venture with Comcast and other cable 
companies to provide wireless communications services. In May 
1998, Sprint took sole possession of Sprint PCS by issuing Sprint 
PCS tracking stock to Comcast and its other cable partners. 
 
Issuer: Liberty Media Underlying Stock: Sprint PCS 
Security type: Sr. Exchange 
Debntrs 
Offering Amount: $750.0 
million 
Issue Date: 11/9/99 Maturity date: 11/15/29 
Details of acquisition of underlying: In September 1996, Sprint 
entered into a joint venture with TCI (which subsequently became 
Liberty Media) and other cable companies to provide wireless 
communications services. In May 1998, Sprint took sole possession 
of Sprint PCS by issuing Sprint PCS tracking stock to TCI and its 
other cable partners. 
 
Issuer: MediaOne Underlying Stock: Vodafone 
ADRs 
Security type: PIES Offering Amount: $1.1 billion 
Issue Date: 10/27/99 Maturity date: 11/15/02 
Details of acquisition of underlying: In April 1998, MediaOne sold 
its domestic wireless business to Airtouch. Part of the consideration 
was Airtouch stock. Airtouch subsequently merged with Vodafone 
and MediaOne’s position in Airtouch was converted to Vodafone 
ADRs. 
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Issuer: Comcast Underlying Stock: Sprint PCS 
Security type: ZONES Offering Amount: $571.4 
million 
Issue Date: 11/2/99 Maturity date: 11/15/29 
Details of acquisition of underlying: In September 1996, Sprint 
entered into a joint venture with Comcast and other cable 
companies to provide wireless communications services. In May 
1998, Sprint took sole possession of Sprint PCS by issuing Sprint 
PCS tracking stock to Comcast and its other cable partners. 
 
Issuer: DECS Trust VI Underlying Stock: MetroMedia 
Security type: DECS Offering Amount: $394.4 
million 
Issue Date: 11/12/99  Maturity date: 11/15/02 
Details of acquisition of underlying: This trust-based deal was 
backed by three private shareholders of MetroMedia Fiber 
Network. 
 
Issuer: Cox Communications Underlying Stock: Sprint PCS 
Security type: PRIZES Offering Amount: $1.1 billion 
Issue Date: 11/22/99 Maturity date: 11/15/29 
Details of acquisition of underlying: In September 1996, Sprint 
entered into a joint venture with Cox Communications and other 
cable companies to provide wireless communications services. In 
May 1998, Sprint took sole possession of Sprint PCS by issuing 
Sprint PCS tracking stock to Cox Communications and its other 
cable partners. 
 
Issuer: Roche Holdings Underlying Stock: Genentech 
Inc. 
Security type: Exchangeable 
Debt 
Offering Amount: $1.0 billion 
Issue Date: 1/12/00 Maturity date: 1/19/10 
Details of acquisition of underlying: In February 1990, Roche 
Holdings bought 60% of the equity of Genentech for $2.1 billion. 
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Issuer: Alliant Energy Underlying Stock: McLeodUSA 
Security type: PAY PHONES Offering Amount: $402.5 
million 
Issue Date: 1/26/00 Maturity date: 1/28/30 
Details of acquisition of underlying: Alliant bought shares in 
McLeodUSA for $30 million between 1993 and 1996. This 
investment was worth more than $1.2 billion in January 2000. 
 
Issuer: NBCI ACES Trust 
(CNET) 
Underlying Stock: NBCI 
Internet, Inc. 
Security type: TRACES Offering Amount: $101.7 
million 
Issue Date: 2/3/00 Maturity date: 2/15/03 
Details of acquisition of underlying: In this trust-based transaction, 
shares from CNET backed the trust, while CNET made a secondary 
offering of shares. NBCi went public in mid-January 2000. In May 
1999, CNET acquired shares in NBCi when NBCi was formed by 
acquiring several internet companies, including CNET’s Snap.com. 
 
Issuer: Cox Communications Underlying Stock: Sprint PCS 
Security type: PHONES Offering Amount: $275.0 
million 
Issue Date: 3/8/00 Maturity date: 3/14/30 
Details of acquisition of underlying: In September 1996, Sprint 
entered into a joint venture with Cox Communications and other 
cable companies to provide wireless communications services. In 
May 1998, Sprint took sole possession of Sprint PCS by issuing 
Sprint PCS tracking stock to Cox Communications and its other 
cable partners. 
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Underlying Stock: Sprint PCS Issuer: Cox Communications 
Security type: Exchangeable 
Subordinated Debentures 
Offering Amount: $700.0 
million 
Issue Date: 4/13/00 Maturity date: 4/19/20 
Details of acquisition of underlying: In September 1996, Sprint 
entered into a joint venture with Cox Communications. and other 
cable companies to provide wireless communications services. In 
May 1998, Sprint took sole possession of Sprint PCS by issuing 
Sprint PCS tracking stock to Cox Communications and its other 
cable partners. 
 
Issuer: Liberty Media Underlying Stock: Sprint PCS 
Security type: Senior 
Exchangeable Debentures 
Offering Amount: $810.0 
million 
Issue Date: 2/10/00 Maturity date: 2/15/30 
Details of acquisition of underlying: In September 1996, Sprint 
entered into a joint venture with TCI (which subsequently became 
Liberty Media) and other cable companies to provide wireless 
communications services. In May 1998, Sprint took sole possession 
of Sprint PCS by issuing Sprint PCS tracking stock to TCI and its 
other cable partners. 
 
Issuer: Express Scripts ACES 
Trust 
Underlying Stock: Express 
Scripts 
Security type: TRACES Offering Amount: $207.0 
million 
Issue Date: 11/03/00 Maturity date: 11/15/03 
Details of acquisition of underlying: The trust was backed by shares 
owned by New York Life Insurance Company (NYLIFE), a mutual 
insurance company. The ACES involved 3 million shares of 
Express Scripts. In a concurrent secondary offering NYLIFE sold 6 
million shares. Until 1992, Express Scripts was entirely owned by 
NYLIFE. 
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Issuer: Liberty Media Group Underlying Stock: Motorola 
Security type: Convertible 
Senior Notes 
Offering Amount: $550.0 
million 
Issue Date: 1/5/01 Maturity date: 1/15/31 
Details of acquisition of underlying: In September 1999, Liberty 
Media received Motorola stock in exchange for its shares of 
General Instrument. Liberty Media owned 28% of General 
Instrument, and was the firm’s largest shareholder. In July 1988, an 
affiliate of TCI (Liberty Mutual’s parent at the time) received 
shares of General Instrument in exchange for certain assets and 
intellectual property. 
 
Issuer: Liberty Media Group Underlying Stock: Senior 
Exchangeable Notes 
Security type: Viacom Offering Amount: $817.7 
million 
Issue Date: 3/5/01 Maturity date: 3/15/31 
Details of acquisition of underlying: In early 2001, Viacom 
acquired Black Entertainment Television (BET) from Liberty 
Media. Liberty Media received 15.2 million shares of Viacom. 
Liberty Media had been a founding investor in BET in 1980. 
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